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I. INTRODUCTION
The suitability doctrine prohibits a securities broker-dealer from
recommending a security to a customer unless she has a reasonable
belief that the security is suitable for that customer.1 It imposes a
1. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Rule 2310, NASD MANUAL (CCH) 4261
(2000) [hereinafter NASD Rule 2310]; NORMAN S. POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW AND
REGULATION § 3.03, at 3-77 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW]. The
Securities and Exchange Commission has taken the position that the suitability doctrine applies
not only to the choice of securities but also to the pattern of trading that a broker recommends
to a customer. For example, purchasing securities with borrowed funds (i.e., margin trading)
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duty on the broker-dealer to take the financial situation, risk threshold, investment sophistication, investment objectives, and other securities holdings of her customers into account when she recommends a security to them.2 The suitability doctrine was originally
formulated more than sixty years ago as an ethical standard by the
National Association of Securities Dealers (“NASD”), a selfregulatory organization (“SRO”) of the securities industry to which
almost all brokers and dealers are required to belong.3 A brokerdealer who recommended an unsuitable security could be disciplined
by the NASD,4 but she would not be subject to legal sanctions.5
Over the years, however, the suitability doctrine has undergone
“a subtle shift from ethics to law.”6 As long ago as 1978, the Second
Circuit held in Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc.,7 that a broker’s
unsuitable recommendation to a customer violated Rule 10b-5, the
SEC’s general and most important antifraud rule.8 Furthermore, a
rather than for cash, or day trading over the Internet, may be unsuitable for a customer because of the risks involved in these activities. See In re Application of Rangen, Admin. Proc.
File No. 3-8994, 1997 SEC LEXIS 762, at *9 (Apr. 8, 1997).
2. See Robert H. Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Broker-Dealers: The
Suitability Doctrine, 1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 449.
3. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires every registered broker-dealer to be a
member of a registered national securities association unless its only transactions are on a stock
exchange of which it is a member. 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(8) (1994); 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b9-1
(2001). The NASD is the only registered national securities association and has about 5,500
member firms. SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACTBOOK 31 (2000). The NASD
adopted the suitability rule in 1939, shortly after the NASD was established as a national securities association. See Robert N. Rapp, Rethinking Risky Investments for That Little Old Lady:
A Realistic Role for Modern Portfolio Theory in Assessing Suitability Obligations of Stockbrokers, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 189, 197 (1998).
4. In two early cases the SEC affirmed NASD disciplinary actions against members for
violating the suitability rule. See In re Philips & Co., 37 S.E.C. 66 (1956); In re Greenberg,
40 S.E.C. 133 (1960).
5. As discussed in more detail below, the overwhelming majority of the courts that
have considered the question have refused to imply a private right of action on the basis of a
violation of an SRO rule.
6. LOUIS LOSS & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 900
(3d ed. 1995).
7. 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1978).
8. Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
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broker’s unsuitable recommendation may be actionable under state
law.9 Although the law differs from state to state in how it characterizes the relationship between a broker and a customer, the prevailing
view is that where the customer places her trust and confidence in
the broker, the broker owes the customer a fiduciary duty and that
an unsuitable recommendation may be a breach of this duty.10
Until the 1980s, the suitability doctrine was applied almost exclusively to recommendations made to individual investors. Perhaps
the clearest example of a suitability violation occurs where a broker
recommends speculative securities to a customer whose financial
situation clearly calls for conservative investments. For example, an
elderly widow or retired person who needs the income from her investments for her living expenses and who has no reasonable
expectation of being able to replace any substantial trading losses
might also be unaware of the risks of the recommended investment
because she lacks the background or education to understand
investments or the securities markets. The investment might also be
inconsistent with her investment objective. For example, the widow
or retiree might want conservative investments, in order to preserve
her principal and receive an assured income, rather than speculation
or short-term trading.11 Thus, the recommendation of speculative
securities might be unsuitable for the investor if she is unable to bear
the risks of the investment, if she is unable to understand these risks,
or if the investment is inconsistent with her investment objectives.12
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). The SEC adopted Rule 10b-5 in 1942, pursuant to its authority under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act to adopt rules prohibiting, “in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance.” 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
In view of the breadth and scope of the rule, which prohibits fraud by any person in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security, the courts have interpreted the rule to
prohibit misconduct by broker-dealers as well as various other types of deceitful conduct, including misleading corporate publicity and trading on inside information.
9. See Rupert v. Clayton Brokerage Co., 737 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1987).
10. See generally POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 2.02.
11. See, e.g., In re Guevara, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42793, 2000 WL 679607, at
*5 (May 18, 2000). In evaluating a security, however, financial managers today often look to
its total return to shareholders, including price appreciation, rather than only to the dividends
paid. See VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATE FINANCE 544–70 (4th ed. 1993).
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investment is inconsistent with her investment objectives.12
In recent years, however, a number of lawsuits and arbitrations
have been brought to recover losses suffered not by individual investors but by institutions, including states and municipalities, publicly
and privately owned companies, and educational and religious organizations. In several well-publicized cases, large government entities, including Orange County, California,13 and the State of West
Virginia,14 and large publicly owned corporations, such as Procter &
Gamble15 and Gibson Greeting Cards,16 have attempted to recover
substantial losses incurred as a result of making risky investments.
Losses have also been incurred by many smaller institutions, including churches, credit unions, colleges, and school districts. In some of
these cases, the institution has claimed that the investments recommended to it by a broker-dealer were unsuitable for the institution in
light of its investment objectives as reflected in the governing law, its
charter, or its written investment policy. In other cases, institutions
claimed that their investment officers were misled by broker-dealers
as to the nature and risk of the recommended investments.
In some of these institutional unsuitability cases, the institutions
and their financial officers were the unsuspecting victims of overly
enthusiastic brokers who misrepresented the nature and risk of the
securities they were selling.17 In others, the institutions’ financial of-

12. Portfolio theory indicates that one should look at the risk of the entire mix of securities in a portfolio, rather than the risk of each security separately. Thus, even a conservative
portfolio might include some speculative securities. See Stuart D. Root, Suitability—the Sophisticated Investor—and Modern Portfolio Management, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 287,
347–48; Janet E. Kerr, Suitability Standards: A New Look at Economic Theory and Current
SEC Disclosure Policy, 16 PAC. L.J. 805, 819–22 (1985).
13. In 1995, Orange County filed a complaint against Merrill Lynch claiming that the
brokerage firm had breached its fiduciary duty to the Country and had committed a securities
fraud by recommending securities that were not authorized for purchase by state law, not suitable for the investment of public monies, and inconsistent with the County’s principal investment objective of preservation of capital. Complaint of County of Orange, In re County of
Orange, 191 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996). In 1998, Merrill Lynch settled the lawsuit
for $400 million. Andrew Pollack & Leslie Wayne, Ending Suit, Merrill Lynch to Pay California County $400 million, N.Y. TIMES, June 3, 1998, at A1.
14. See State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995).
15. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio
1996).
16. See In re BT Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 35,136, 1994 SEC LEXIS 4041
(Dec. 22, 1994).
17. See, e.g., In re Schulte, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-9051, 1997 WL 173668 (S.E.C.
Apr. 10, 1997).
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ficers purchased the securities even though they were aware of their
unsuitability for their institutional employers; thus, the officers were
themselves guilty of misconduct.18 The willingness (or even eagerness) of an institution’s financial officer to act on a broker’s recommendation to buy an unsuitable high-yield (and high-risk) security
may also be partly or wholly the result of perceived pressure from the
financial officer’s superiors or governing board to take risks in order
to obtain higher returns on the institution’s investments in times of
tight budgets and low interest rates.19
Given the centrality of the suitability doctrine to the nature of
the relationship between a broker and his customer, it is not surprising that a substantial body of writing exists on the subject; furthermore, the suitability cases involving institutional customers that arose
during the 1980s and 1990s provided additional stimulus to law review writers.20 The justification for writing yet another article on the
subject is that it is necessary to reexamine the assumptions that are
routinely made by judges and legal writers: that institutional investors are sophisticated and that, whether sophisticated or not, they do
not need the protections afforded by suitability rules. Whether insti-

18. In the Orange County case, Merrill Lynch argued that Robert L. Citron, the
County Treasurer, made all the investment decisions and was aware of the risks. Citron was
criminally prosecuted and received a one-year jail term for misappropriation of funds. Pollack
& Wayne, supra note 13.
19. See Derivatives Use by State and Local Governments: Testimony Before the House
Comm. on Banking, Fin. and Urban Affairs (Oct. 5, 1994) (statement of Alan McDougle, Director of Finance & Purchasing, Lima, Ohio) [hereinafter Testimony of Alan McDougle].
20. See Seth C. Anderson & Donald Arthur Winslow, Defining Suitability, 81 KY. L.J.
105 (1992–93); Willa E. Gibson, Investors, Look Before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine is
Not Suitable for OTC Derivatives Dealers, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 527 (1998); Kerr, supra note
12; Donald C. Langevoort, Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law from Behavioral
Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 627 (1996);
Jerry W. Markham, Protecting the Institutional Investor—Jungle Predator or Shorn Lamb?, 12
YALE J. ON REG. 345 (1995); Mundheim, supra note 2; Norman S. Poser, Civil Liability for
Unsuitable Recommendations, 19 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. 67 (1986); Rapp, supra note 3,
at 190 n.3; Lyle Roberts, Suitability Claims Under Rule 10b-5: Are Public Entities Sophisticated Enough to Use Derivatives?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 801 (1996); Root, supra note 12; Jennifer A. Frederick, Note, Not Just for Widows & Orphans Anymore: The Inadequacy of the
Current Suitability Rules for the Derivatives Market, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 97 (1995); Geoffrey B. Goldman, Note, Crafting a Suitability Requirement for the Sale of Over-the-Counter
Derivatives: Should Regulators “Punish the Wall Street Hounds of Greed”?, 95 COLUM. L.
REV. 1112 (1995); Dennis J. Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, Suitability Standards for Sophisticated Investors, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 19, 1998, at 5; Roberta S. Karmel, The Suitability Doctrine,
N.Y.L.J., June 15, 1995, at 3; Gregory J. Wallance & Andrew S. Carron, Suitability Disputes
and the Institutional Investor, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9, 1997, at 1.
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tutional investors should be able to use the suitability doctrine to recover investment losses from their broker-dealers poses complex
questions of policy and law. Most courts, arbitrators, and legal commentators have been unsympathetic to these institutional investors
with suitability claims. The reluctance to award damages to these
claimants seems to be based, at least in part, on a reluctance to apply
a doctrine that is essentially paternalistic in its nature to a broker’s
dealings with its institutional (and wealthy individual) customers.21
Critics of the doctrine as so applied reason as follows: first, investment officers of institutions tend to be sophisticated professionals;
second, even if an institution hires an unsophisticated investment officer or fails to supervise him properly, that is the institution’s own
fault. The first prong of the argument tends to support establishing a
rebuttable presumption of institutional sophistication, while the second prong tends to support a conclusive presumption of sophistication. According to the reasoning of these critics, the institutional investor, not the broker-dealer who knowingly or recklessly
recommends an unsuitable security to the investor, should bear the
responsibility for the recommendation if it goes bad.
It is my purpose in this article to examine the above premises
from both a factual and normative point of view. While many institutional investment officers are highly experienced and capable, many
others lack the ability or training to understand the nature and risks
of the complex investments that many securities firms sell to their
customers. Many institutional investors, including small ones and
those whose principal purpose is not investment, should not be
faulted for their failure to hire sophisticated investment officers, because it is not cost-effective to employ persons with the training to
understand arcane investment vehicles.
Furthermore, the system of compensation in general use on Wall
Street, under which broker-dealers and their salespersons receive very
large commissions if they are successful in their sales pitches, gives
them a strong incentive to oversell. Even a sophisticated investment
officer may not be able to resist selling pressure from a highly motivated and well-trained salesperson. It has long been held that sophisticated as well as unsophisticated investors are entitled to protection

21. See Markham, supra note 20, at 369 (arguing that the suitability rule is “a very paternalistic approach to customer protection”).
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from fraudulent conduct by securities salespeople22 and that such
conduct is actionable under Rule 10b-5 only if it is made with scienter, i.e., intentionally or recklessly.23
Following a brief discussion of the key role played by institutional investors in today’s securities markets, Part II discusses the applicability of the suitability doctrine to institutional investors. Part II
raises two principal questions. First, to what extent can the investment officers of institutions be considered sophisticated? Second,
should the courts adopt a presumption (either rebuttable or conclusive) of institutional sophistication? Because a conclusive presumption of sophistication is, in effect, a legal rule, it would protect broker-dealers from liability for unsuitable recommendations made to
unsophisticated as well as sophisticated institutional investors.
Part III will examine the three principal regulatory and legal
categories on which the suitability doctrine is based—self-regulatory
rules, federal securities fraud, and common-law breach of fiduciary
duty—and the difficulties faced by institutional plaintiffs in bringing
an action to recover losses suffered as a result of unsuitable recommendations. My conclusion is that the goals of the federal securities
laws—protection of investors and the markets—as well as traditional
principles of agency law, require that a broker-dealer be held to account in damages for unsuitable recommendations that are made
recklessly or with knowledge of their unsuitability, whether the customer is an individual or an institutional investor.
It is important to note, however, that most claims brought
against broker-dealers by their customers, including their institutional customers, are heard by arbitration panels, not by courts, because broker-dealers generally insist that their customers sign predispute arbitration agreements when they open their accounts.24 No
distinction will be made in this article between lawsuits and arbitrations, since arbitrators are required to apply the same substantive law

22. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969).
23. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that scienter is a
necessary element of a violation of Rule 10b-5).
24. In 1987 the Supreme Court held that pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate claims
brought under the 1934 Act were enforceable. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987). Following McMahon, arbitration largely replaced litigation as the method of
resolving disputes between customers and their brokers. Norman S. Poser, When ADR Eclipses
Litigation: The Brave New World of Securities Arbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095, 1101
(1993).
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that a court would.25 Nonetheless, there is a notable difference in
that arbitration panels typically do not write opinions explaining
their decisions, and these decisions have no value as precedent.26 Furthermore, the scope of judicial review of arbitral awards is extremely
narrow.27 It therefore is often impossible to ascertain either the basis
for an arbitral award or whether the award reflects the current state
of the law.28
II. THE INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR AND
INVESTMENT SOPHISTICATION

A. Institutional Investment in the Securities Markets
1. The extent of institutional investment
Perhaps the most important and influential development in the
securities markets during the past half-century has been the growth
of institutional investment, in both relative and absolute terms. The
percentage of all corporate stock owned by American institutions
(principally pension funds and mutual funds) increased from seven
percent of the total in 1950 to fifty-one percent in 2000.29 In abso-

25. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989)
(“By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial,
forum.”) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1985)).
26. See Martin H. Malin & Robert F. Ladenson, Privatizing Justice: A Jurisprudential
Perspective on Labor and Employment Arbitration from the Steelworkers Trilogy to Gilmer,
44 HASTINGS L.J. 1187, 1226 (1993) (“under the prevailing judicial view, . . . the only law
that results [from an arbitral award] is the award itself, and that law is binding only on the immediate parties.”).
27. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1994), a court may not vacate an
arbitrator’s award simply because the arbitrator made erroneous findings of fact or misinterpreted the law, see Miller v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 884 F.2d 128, 130 (4th Cir. 1989),
but only if the arbitrator acted in manifest disregard of the law, see Halligan v. Piper Jaffray,
Inc., 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1286 (1999).
28. See Norman S. Poser, Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards: Manifest Disregard of
the Law, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 471 (1998); see also Lewis D. Lowenfels & Alan R. Bromberg,
Suitability in Securities Transactions, 54 BUS. LAW. 1557, 1593 (1999) (asserting that tribunals have a great deal of flexibility in deciding cases initiated by customers against brokers for
unsuitable transactions).
29. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 2000 61 (2001) [hereinafter NYSE FACT BOOK 2000].
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lute terms, institutions’ assets increased more than a hundred-fold
during this period, from $143 billion to over $19 trillion.30 Institutional investors have also outdistanced individuals as the principal
type of participant in the securities markets.31 It has been estimated
that institutional investors account for about seventy percent of trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange (“NYSE”), which is by
far the nation’s largest market for equity securities.32

2. Regulatory implications of institutional investment
The growth of institutional investment has important regulatory
implications. In view of the presumed greater ability of institutional
investors to fend for themselves, it may be argued that the regulatory
burden placed on persons selling securities to institutional investors
should be lightened.33 On the other hand, because individual inves30. Id.
31. The growth of institutional investment is the result of a variety of social, political,
and economic forces, including more liberal retirement benefits to employees, favorable tax
treatment of retirement funds, and the propensity of individuals to invest indirectly in the market through mutual funds rather than directly. See JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES
REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 27–28 (2d ed. 1997).
32. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND
INVESTMENT TERMS 282 (5th ed. 1998). In the year 2000, the total market capitalization of
stocks listed on the NYSE was $12.4 trillion, compared to $3.6 trillion for Nasdaq, the second
largest equity market. SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK 48 (2001)
[hereinafter SECURITIES INDUSTRY FACT BOOK].
Between 1960 and 2000 the average daily volume of trading on the NYSE increased
from 3 million shares to 1.04 billion shares. NYSE FACT BOOK 2000, supra note 29, at 100. A
good indication of the dominance of the market by institutional investors is the percentage of
trading volume that is in block transactions (i.e., transactions of more than 10,000 shares),
because relatively few individuals have the resources to trade in such large amounts. In 1965,
16.2 percent of reported share volume on the NYSE consisted of block transactions. NEW
YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK FOR THE YEAR 1998, at 93 (1999) [hereinafter NYSE
FACT BOOK 1998]. By 1979 this figure had risen to 26.5 percent, and by 2000, block transactions accounted for 51.7 percent of reported volume. In absolute terms, block transactions
increased more than sixty-fold in the past twenty-one years—from 2.2 trillion shares in 1979 to
135.7 trillion shares in 2000. Assuming that most block transactions are made by institutional
customers, this percentage increase demonstrates the importance of institutions in the securities markets. Id. at 93.
The dominance of the NYSE in the securities industry is demonstrated by the fact that
in 2000 the 271 member firms of the NYSE that did business with the public, although comprising less than four percent of all broker-dealer firms, accounted for seventy percent of all
revenues and eighty-two percent of all assets of the securities industry. SECURITIES INDUSTRY
FACT BOOK, supra note 32, at 28.
33. See Saul Cohen, The Death of Securities Regulation, WALL ST. J., Jan. 17, 1991, at
A10.
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tors now tend to participate in the market indirectly through mutual
funds, pension funds, and other institutions rather than by opening
up their own individual brokerage accounts, it can be argued that the
SEC and other securities regulators should direct their regulatory efforts to broker-dealers’ selling practices with respect to institutional
investors. As institutions have become a major source of commission
revenue for brokerage firms, they share with individual investors the
dubious honor of being targets of predatory and abusive brokers. It
is, therefore, hardly surprising that sales of securities to institutional
investors have presented suitability problems.

3. Institutional investors: Size and purposes
There is no single definition of the term “institution,” “institutional investor,” or “institutional customer.”34 The NASD defines
“institutional customer” as “any entity other than a natural person.”35 The term thus includes mutual funds and closed-end funds;
private and public pension funds; life and casualty insurance companies; bank-managed personal trusts; corporate profit-sharing plans;
state and local governments; savings institutions; commercial banks;
credit unions; and various kinds of nonprofit organizations, such as
churches and other religious organizations, college endowment
funds, foundations, and the like.36
Institutional investors vary widely in size. While the largest insti-

34. A leading financial dictionary defines “institutional investor” simply as an “organization that trades large volumes of securities.” DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 32, at 282.
35. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Rule 2310-3, NASD MANUAL (CCH) 4265
(2000) [hereinafter NASD Rule 2310-3].
36. At the end of 2000, institutions held $10.0 trillion in U.S. equities (i.e., shares of
corporate stock), or 58.9% of the total, while households held the remainder. Of these holdings, mutual funds held $3.2 trillion (19.1%); private pension funds held $2.0 trillion (11.8%);
public pension funds held $1.4 trillion (7.9%); foreign institutions held $1.7 trillion (10.1%);
life insurance companies held $943 billion (5.5%); bank personal trusts held $315 billion
(1.9%); other insurance companies held $188 billion (1.1%); state and local governments held
$115 billion (0.7%); and closed-end funds held $36 billion (0.2%). SECURITIES INDUSTRY
FACT BOOK, supra note 32, at 70–71.
If all financial assets are taken into account, the sheer size of institutional holdings is
even more impressive. Just to list the largest categories of institution, at the end of 1999, commercial banks held $6.0 trillion in financial assets; private pension funds held $5.0 trillion; mutual funds held $4.5 trillion; life insurance companies held $3.1 trillion; and state and local
government employee retirement funds held $3.0 trillion. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED.
RESERVE SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND
OUTSTANDINGS, FOURTH QUARTER 1999, at 69–77 (2000).
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tutions own or manage vast amounts of money, there are many
smaller institutional investors whose holdings of securities and other
investment instruments are relatively modest. Some idea of the variety of institutional investors in terms of their size and characteristics
may be gained by looking at the lawsuits and arbitrations in which
suitability issues have been raised. The plaintiffs in these disputes include the State of West Virginia;37 Orange County, California;38 the
City of San Jose, California;39 several towns and villages;40 local governmental authorities;41 public educational institutions;42 public and
corporate pension funds;43 union pension funds;44 commercial
banks;45 savings and loan institutions;46 religious organizations;47
publicly held companies;48 and family trusts.49 A review of these cases
shows that the investment assets of the institutions that have initiated
claims against broker-dealers raising suitability issues ranged from $2
million (in the case of a corporate pension plan)50 to $7.4 billion (in

37. See State v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 459 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995).
38. See In re County of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996).
39. See City of San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C 84-20601
RFP, 1991 WL 352485 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991).
40. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Poder, 712 F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
41. See Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., 639 F. Supp.
108 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
42. See Cmty. Coll. Dist. No. 508 v. Westcap Gov’t Sec., Inc., No. 94 C 1920, 1994
WL 530849 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 1994).
43. See Minneapolis Employees Ret. Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176
(Minn. 1994); Vill. of Arlington Heights, 712 F. Supp. 680; Duffy v. Cavalier, 259 Cal. Rptr.
162, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), review granted, 778 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1989), review denied, 264
Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
44. See Pension Fund-Mid Jersey Trucking Indus.-Local 701 v. Omni Funding Group,
731 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1990).
45. See Associated Randall Bank v. Griffin, Kubik, Stephens & Thompson, Inc., 3 F.3d
208 (7th Cir. 1993); Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir.
1997).
46. See MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 F.2d
1249 (10th Cir. 1989).
47. See Congregation of the Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Kidder Peabody & Co.,
800 F.2d 177 (7th Cir. 1986); Westchester Jewish Ctr. v. Gruntal & Co., 1994 NYSE Arb.
Dec. LEXIS 615 (July 6, 1995) (Filson, Gray, Guggenheimer, Arbs.).
48. See Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio
1996); In re Gibson Greetings, 159 F.R.D. 499 (S.D. Ohio 1994); In re BT Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 34-35136, 1994 SEC LEXIS 4041 (Dec. 22, 1994).
49. See Boettcher & Co. v. Munson, 854 P.2d 199 (Colo. 1993).
50. See Duffy v. Cavalier, 259 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989), review
granted, 778 P.2d 549 (Cal. 1989), review denied, 264 Cal. Rptr. 740 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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the case of Orange County, California).51 Obviously, the size of an
institution affects its financial ability to hire investment officers with
the training and professional skills necessary to understand the complex types of financial instruments marketed by the securities industry today.
Institutional investors differ not only in their size but also in
their underlying purposes. The principal or sole purpose of some
types of institutions, most notably mutual funds and pension funds,
is to invest money on behalf of their shareholders or beneficiaries.
The growth of these institutions into multi-billion-dollar giants reflects the trend of individuals to invest their savings in the market indirectly rather than directly, thus enabling even investors with little
capital to invest to gain the twin advantages of professional management of their money and diversification of their investments. Such
investment-oriented institutions, particularly if they are large, can be
expected to employ trained and experienced professionals to handle
their investments, professionals who will bring their own independent judgment to bear on brokers’ recommendations. For many types
of institutions, however, investment of their funds is only a secondary or incidental purpose. These include such entities as municipalities, educational organizations, business corporations, churches, and
other nonprofit organizations. These institutions may not understand the need for, and may not be able to afford, a professional staff
that is trained to keep abreast of and evaluate all the new types of
“financial engineering” that brokerage firms may urge upon them.
The nature and purposes of an institution will also determine the
time frame of its investments. Depending on its stated investment
objectives, a mutual fund or large pension fund, which invests the
funds it manages for the needs of its shareholders or beneficiaries,
may have a large proportion of its assets allocated to long-term investments, such as stocks and bonds. On the other hand, the normal
investment activities of a municipality, thrift company, or educational, religious, or other nonprofit organization, whose liquid assets
consist largely of idle funds that will be needed periodically for the
operations of the organization, will be different. Such institutions
typically buy low-risk or risk-free short-term instruments from a bank

51. See In re County of Orange, 191 B.R. 1005 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1996); PHILIPPE
JORION, BIG BETS GONE BAD: DERIVATIVES AND BANKRUPTCY IN ORANGE COUNTY 21
(1995).

1505

2POS.DOC

3/5/02 9:06 PM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2001

or brokerage house and roll them over every few months, a procedure that does not require a great deal of time or financial sophistication.52
For an institution whose principal purpose is not investment, the
responsibility for handling its investments typically is given to the institution’s treasurer or chief financial officer, who may have several
other important functions that take up most of his time, and who
may possess little knowledge or understanding of the securities markets or complex financial instruments such as derivatives.53 Such a
person’s understanding of the market or of particular investment instruments may be inadequate to enable him to exercise independent
judgment concerning the advisability of investing in novel or complex instruments, especially in the face of a determined and skillful
selling effort by a broker. Furthermore, it may not be economically
feasible for the institution to hire full-time professional money managers to handle its investments. It may also not seem necessary to the
institution to retain outside professional advice, even if that is affordable, if the broker-dealer represents itself to the institution as an investment adviser working for the institution, upon whom the institution can safely rely, rather than as a commercial venture whose
paramount goal is to maximize its sales.

B. The Investment Sophistication of Institutional
Investment Officers
1. Why sophistication is important
The investor’s sophistication is a key concept in relation to claims
based on unsuitable recommendations. If the claim is brought under
Rule 10b-5, which prohibits fraud in connection with the purchase
or sale of a security, sophistication is relevant to the question of

52. Some educational and religious organizations, however, also have permanent endowments, which may be invested in stocks and bonds.
53. For example, Philip Luhmann, the treasurer of the City Colleges of Chicago, was
responsible for all of City Colleges’ banking relationships; for preparing its budget; for receiving, maintaining custody of, and disbursing cash; and for setting up procedures that dealt with
the institution’s cash management. He could, therefore, devote only a limited amount of his
time to his investment responsibilities. Transcript of testimony of Philip R. Luhmann at 3–4,
In re Westcap Enter., Case No. 96-43191-H2-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 1997) [hereinafter Westcap I], rev’d on other grounds, 230 F.3d 717 (5th Cir. 2000) [hereinafter Westcap
II].
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whether misleading statements or omissions made by the brokerdealer were material54 and whether the investor justifiably relied on
the misstatements or omissions.55 Materiality and justifiable reliance
are both requisite elements in a private suit brought under Rule 10b5.56 In a suitability claim brought under Rule 10b-5, control of the
account by the broker may also be a necessary element of the claim.57
The investor’s sophistication is relevant to the question of whether
the investor or the broker controlled the account.58
If an institutional investor’s claim is that the broker-dealer, by
recommending unsuitable securities, breached a fiduciary duty to the
investor, the sophistication of the institution’s investment officers
may be relevant to the issue of whether the broker owed fiduciary
duties to the institution, a question which in many jurisdictions depends on whether the investment officers placed their trust and confidence in the broker-dealer.59

54. See Lehman Brothers Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals Int’l Non-Ferrous Metals
Trading Co., No. 94 Civ. 8301 JFK, 2000 WL 1702039 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000).
55. See Davis v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 906 F.2d 1206, 1217
(8th Cir. 1990); Michael Slonim, Customer Sophistication and a Plaintiff’s Duty of Due Diligence: A Proposed Framework for Churning Actions in Nondiscretionary Accounts Under
SEC Rule 10b-5, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1101, 1106–07 (1986) (“[T]he inquiry into customer
sophistication is really an equivalent of the Rule 10b-5 requirement that the customer exercise
good judgment and due care in order to recover damages. This requirement is termed due
diligence.”).
For a comprehensive discussion of the cases requiring that the plaintiff justifiably rely on
the defendant’s misstatements or omissions in order to state a cause of action under Rule 10b5, see WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING § 4.1 n.11 (1996 &
Supp. 2001). The justifiable reliance requirement is sometimes described as a requirement that
the plaintiff exercise due diligence. Id.; see also infra text accompanying notes 172–80.
56. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
57. See O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893, 898 (10th Cir. 1992).
58. See Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co., 681 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1982).
59. Lehman Bros., 2000 WL 1702039, at *26 (quoting Scott v. Dime Sav. Bank, 886
F. Supp. 1073, 1078 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 101 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1996)) (applying New
York law); see also MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886
F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1989) (applying Oklahoma law); Connor v. First of Mich. Corp., Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 95,350 (W.D. Mich. 1990) (applying Michigan law); Police Ret. Sys. of
St. Louis v. Midwest Inv. Advisory Servs., Inc., 706 F. Supp. 708 (E.D. Mo. 1989), aff’d, 940
F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1991) (applying Missouri law). For a discussion of the circumstances under
which a broker-dealer is considered to be a fiduciary of its customer, see POSER, BROKERDEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 2.02.
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2. Sophistication and complex investments
An investor usually is regarded as sophisticated if she has sufficient understanding and intelligence to be able to evaluate a broker’s
recommendations and to exercise independent judgment as to those
recommendations.60 Strictly speaking, an institutional investor, not
being a natural person, cannot have (or, for that matter, lack) sophistication. The degree of sophistication of an institutional investor is
necessarily the sophistication of the individual or individuals to
whom the institution gives the responsibility of investing its money.
Some courts have been unwilling to impose liability on brokerdealers who recommend unsuitable securities to institutional customers, because they assume the investment officers of institutions to
be sophisticated. Investor sophistication, however, has meaning only
in relation to the instruments that are being sold. During recent
years, a plethora of novel and highly complex securities have come to
the market. Many of these are called derivatives, because their value
is derived from the performance of an underlying financial asset, index, or other investment.61 Some derivatives, such as options on a
stock or a well-known index (e.g., the Standard & Poor’s 500 Industrial Index), have standardized terms and are traded on stock exchanges.62 Others are custom-made derivative instruments (not all of
which, however, fall within the definition of a security). Many of
these “over-the-counter” derivatives, including complex options,
swaps, and collateralized mortgage obligations (“CMOs”), have
been sold to institutions.63 Some of these instruments are contracts
60. See Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc. v. Adams, 718 P.2d 508, 516 (Colo.
1986).
61. DOWNES & GOODMAN, supra note 32, at 147. For a description of derivatives and
their uses, see Frank Partnoy, Adding Derivatives to the Corporate Law Mix, 34 GA. L. REV.
599 (2000). For a practicing lawyer’s view that regulation of derivatives is often counterproductive, see Saul S. Cohen, The Challenge of Derivatives, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1993 (1995).
62. For a description of the exchange-listed options market, see Norman S. Poser, Options Account Fraud: Securities Churning in a New Context, 39 BUS. LAW. 571, 586–92
(1984).
63. For descriptions of a complex custom-made swap and an option that were sold by a
broker-dealer to a large corporation, see In re BT Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No.
35,136, 1994 SEC LEXIS 4041, at *10–*13 (Dec. 22, 1994).
In 1994, a municipal financial officer testified before Congress concerning the variety
and complexity of derivatives:
Collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs), zero-coupon instruments such as
STRIPS, stripped into interest-onlys (IOs) and principal-onlys (POs), forwards, fu-
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that are custom-made by broker-dealer firms for the purpose of selling them to their institutional customers.
While a derivative may be purchased for the purpose of hedging
and is a useful tool for limiting risk, derivatives can themselves be
highly risky, and, owing to their complexity, the risk is not always
readily apparent to the person who assumes it.64 The investment officer of an institution who has no difficulty understanding the limited
risk involved in purchasing certain traditional institutional investments, such as short-term Treasury bills and high-grade commercial
paper, may lack the necessary experience or training to evaluate a
complex derivative instrument and may, therefore, place his trust in
the judgment and honesty of the broker to select the institution’s investments.65 In some instances, this trust has been misplaced.66
In a rapidly changing financial world driven by increasing competition, new technology, and new investment instruments, any generalizations about investors’ sophistication must be viewed with suspicion. According to one commentator, “[I]nvestor sophistication, as
that term is generally used, may in fact be a myth. Certainly it is a
concept that has to carry far too much weight in light of the search
by fiduciaries for help in understanding the complexities of modern
investment opportunities, strategies and markets.”67 It is clear that
the officers of many small institutions who are responsible for handling their investments lack investment sophistication. Sometimes
these persons perform several other functions and have neither the
time nor the training to keep up with developments in modern
finance, including the creation of complex investment instruments
tures, currency and interest rate swaps, options, floaters/inverse floaters, floaters
hedged with swaps, indexed/fixed-rate bonds, cap, floors and collars, as well as exotic fixed-rate programs known as RIBS/SAVRS, PARS/INFLOS, and Bull/Bear
floaters—this myriad of esoteric and intricate products is enough to confound even
the most experienced finance professional, whether public or private.
Testimony of Alan McDougle, supra note 19.
64. One definition of a derivative is a “transferable high-risk security such as a future or
an option.” JOHN CLARK, INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF BANKING AND FINANCE 111
(1999).
65. See Root, supra note 12, at 337 (“Our financial world is one in which investment
opportunities are evolving swiftly; institutional management is unable realistically to keep up
with changes produced by the so-called ‘rocket scientists’; and, regulatory authorities themselves are often ill-equipped to assess the impact of investment choices produced from a vast
array of new creations.”).
66. See, e.g., In re BT Sec. Corp., 1994 SEC LEXIS 4041.
67. Root, supra note 12, at 355.
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that are designed to allocate and transfer risk.68

3. Lack of sophistication of some institutional investment officers
A relatively recent SEC administrative action illustrates the lack
of sophistication of some of the smaller institutions. Between 1990
and 1994 a securities salesman named Kenneth J. Schulte and several
other salespersons, working out of a room in Houston, Texas, sold
over $39.4 million worth of risky derivative securities to at least thirteen municipalities and school districts in Ohio. The Ohio investors
lost more than $8.2 million.69 An SEC administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) found that the financial officers of these institutional investors were unsophisticated and did not understand derivatives. They
had informed Schulte that they had conservative investment policies
and maintained essentially risk-free portfolios. Nevertheless, Schulte,
by means of aggressive and intimidating sales tactics, was able to sell
highly speculative securities to these institutions. By persistent phone
calls, he pressured the financial officers to buy the derivatives. The
investors relied on Schulte’s representations that the derivatives were
risk-free investments guaranteed by the United States government or
a government agency. The ALJ found that Schulte knew that these
statements were false and that he persuaded the investors to purchase
the securities regardless of whether they were consistent with their
investment objectives. He did not provide the investors with written
materials describing the securities, nor did he disclose or discuss with
them the substantial risks involved in the investments.70
Schulte preyed primarily upon the unsophisticated financial officers of small institutions.71 However, the representatives of larger in68. See Transcript of Testimony of Richard C. McCoy, vol. 29 at 5179–80, City of San
Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C. 84-20601 RFP, 1991 WL 352485
(N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991).
69. In re Schulte, Admin. Proc. File No. 3-9051, 1997 WL 173668, at *2–*3 (S.E.C.
Apr. 10, 1997).
70. Id. at *3–*4. The SEC barred Schulte from the securities industry. He was also convicted in federal court of wire fraud, mail fraud, and securities fraud and was sentenced to fiftyone months imprisonment. His conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Sixth Circuit.
United States v. Schulte, No. 97-3511, 1999 Fed. App. 110U, 1999 WL 331655 (6th Cir.
1999). The SEC also brought a civil action against him in federal court in Ohio, which led to
an injunction against him and an order to disgorge $400,000 in commissions that he obtained
through fraudulent means. Schulte, 1997 WL 173668, at *4.
71. The response of the Securities Industry Association, the trade association of the securities industry, to this kind of situation is that the institutions, not the securities dealers, are
at fault:
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stitutions, whether or not they can be considered sophisticated, may
be unable to counter a broker-dealer’s efforts to mislead them. For
example, BT Securities, the broker-dealer affiliate of Bankers Trust,
was found by the SEC to have intentionally allowed Gibson Greetings, Inc., a publicly owned corporation, to believe that the risk of
certain interest-rate swaps was substantially less than it actually was.72
Even professional managers can be influenced by recommendations of broker-dealers. Economists have noted the “herd behavior”
of professional institutional investors. These money managers are
known to mimic each other in allocating their funds’ assets. A money
manager who follows the herd in making an investment decision will
avoid damage to his reputation if the decision turns out to be wrong.
A study of the factors that determined institutional investors’ decisions to purchase a particular stock showed that:
Purchase of stocks that had recently had large price run-ups tended
to be motivated by the advice of others (other investment professionals, newsletters, etc.). . . . This suggests that the comfort inher-

Investment officers who commit a municipality to a financial obligation that they do
not understand merit neither sympathy nor a remedy when losses result. Municipalities can retain professional advisors to assist investment officers in evaluating transactions and strategies they do not fully understand. On the other hand, dealers who
have not been engaged as financial advisors and who do not have access to the type
of information necessary to evaluate the appropriateness of a transaction should not
be held responsible for such a determination.
Testimony Before House Comm. on Banking and Fin. Servs., Subcomm. on Capital Markets,
Sec. and Gov’t Sponsored Enters., 104th Cong. (1995) (statement of Marc E. Lackritz, President of the Sec. Indus. Ass’n).
To be sure, the suggestion that an institution that does not have its own sophisticated
investment officers can retain professional advisors has merit. However, owing to the officer’s
lack of sophistication and the broker’s reassurance, an investment officer may have believed
that he understood the investments and therefore did not see a need to turn to others for advice.
72. BT Securities’ internal taping system recorded a conversation in which a managing
director of the brokerage firm discussed the “differential” between the actual value of Gibson’s
positions and the valuation that BT Securities provided to Gibson:
I think we should use this [downward market price movement] as an opportunity.
We should just call [the Gibson contact], and maybe chip away at the differential a
little more. I mean we told him $8.1 million when the real number was 14. So now
if the real number is 16, we’ll tell him that it is 11. You know, just slowly chip away
at that differential between what it really is and what we’re telling him.
In re BT Sec. Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 35,136, 1994 SEC LEXIS 4041, at *7 (Dec.
22, 1994); see also In re Smith Barney, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-39118, 1997 WL
583732 (Sept. 23, 1997) (SEC settled administrative action against broker-dealer for allegedly
making false disclosures to municipal customer concerning swaps).
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ent in following common wisdom can lead professional money
managers to invest in stocks where fundamentals might dictate otherwise.73

Even a sophisticated investment officer may be easy prey for a
skillful and highly motivated securities salesman. As Professor
Langevoort has pointed out, a broker may subtly manipulate an
institutional investor’s professional ego:
Take, for example, a well-prepared broker who pitches an exotic,
customized interest rate swap to a corporate treasurer. Even if the
treasurer has a fair degree of financial sophistication, it is unlikely
that her knowledge or understanding extends to such a unique
product. Under these circumstances, many potential buyers will resist displaying their ignorance.74

An illustration of a relatively large institutional investor suffering
substantial losses as a result of unsuitable recommendations is the
experience of the City of San Jose (the “City”). A lack of institutional sophistication (and perhaps an excess of institutional vanity)
was a contributing factor to the market losses suffered by the City.
During the early 1980s, the City engaged in short-term trading (including many purchases and sales in large volume on the same day)
of 30-year Treasury bonds. Although the credit risk of long-term
Treasury bonds is virtually nil, there is a substantial market risk unless
the holder plans to hold the bonds until their maturity, because the
market price of long-term bonds is extremely sensitive to fluctuations
in interest rates.75 The City lost about $60 million in 1984, when
interest rates rose and the market value of the bonds plummeted.76

73. David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 465, 477 (1990).
74. Donald C. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 657.
75. As the maturity of a bond increases, any difference between the current rate of interest and the yield of the bond will have a greater effect on the price of the bond. Long-term
bonds, therefore, have more price volatility than short-term bonds. See SIDNEY HOMER &
MARTIN L. LEIBOWITZ, INSIDE THE YIELD BOOK: NEW TOOLS FOR BOND MARKET
STRATEGY 44–53 (1972).
76. City of San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C. 84-20601 RFP,
1991 WL 352485 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991). The City had been able to engage in trading on a
large scale through the use of a form of financing known as reverse repurchase agreements,
pursuant to which the City resold the securities that it purchased to the brokerage firm, agreeing to repurchase them at a higher price. The difference between the resale and repurchase
prices represented the cost of the financing. See MARCIA STIGUM, THE REPO AND REVERSE
MARKETS 25–27 (1989).
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The City sued several brokerage firms and banks in federal court for
securities fraud, claiming that they had recommended securities and
a pattern of investment that were unsuitable for a municipality
investing public funds.77 After a six-month trial, a federal jury
awarded the City a verdict of $18 million in damages against two
brokerage firms, although several jurors afterwards criticized City
officials for their failure to monitor investments and for failing to
alert the City to danger.78
Testimony given at the trial revealed that the officials who managed the City’s investments had little investment experience and an
inadequate understanding of the risks of the kind of trading in which
the City was engaged. Richard McCoy, the City’s treasurer, had a
Master’s degree in Business Administration but only limited experience with investments.79 Moreover, because McCoy had numerous
other duties to perform as treasurer, he largely relied on the assistant
treasurer, Arthur Matthiesen, to handle the City’s investments. A
long-term employee of the City, Matthiesen had only a high school
education and no training in investments.80 Nor had he ever read a
book on investments.81 It is difficult to believe that the brokers and
bank employees who dealt with Matthiesen were not cynically taking
advantage of his naiveté and sense of his own importance.82
77. The City also claimed that the defendants had breached their fiduciary duty to it
under the common law. The judge dismissed this claim on the ground that the City did not
have a fiduciary relationship with the defendants. The jury also rejected a claim of churning the
City’s account.
78. City of San Jose, 1991 WL 352485; see also Shearson, Paine Webber Found Guilty,
L.A. TIMES, June 22, 1990, at D2. Ten other bank and brokerage-firm defendants had meanwhile settled with the City for a total of $12 million. The jury also imposed damages of
$500,000 on the City’s outside auditing firm. The verdict also included $8.4 million in interest. Maline Hazle, San Jose Bond Suit Victory—City Wins $26 Million in Verdict, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS, June 21, 1990, at 1A. The two brokerage firms against which the verdict
had been entered moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but the case was settled
before the motion could be decided. See City of San Jose, 1991 WL 352485.
79. Transcript of testimony of Richard C. McCoy, vol. 29 at 5179–80, City of San Jose,
1991 WL 352485.
80. Transcript of testimony of Arthur Robert Matthiesen, vols. 8-1374, 8-1402, 81404, City of San Jose, 1991 WL 352485. Before becoming assistant treasurer, Matthiesen
had worked for the City of San Jose, among other things, as a license inspector, collector of
sewer charges, orderer of supplies, and as a designer of forms. Id. at 8-1382, 8-1390.
81. Id. at 8-1404. Matthiesen testified at the trial that he had never heard of anything
called a fundamental or a technical approach to investing. Id. at 8-1437, 8-1440.
82. See also Westcap I, Case No. 96-43191-H2-11 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 1997).
In Westcap II, a bankruptcy court found that Luhmann, the treasurer of the City Colleges of
Chicago, was not fully aware of the high-risk nature of certain collateralized mortgage obliga-
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C. Should There Be a Presumption That Investment Officers
of Institutions Are Sophisticated?
Although not all investment officers are sophisticated in the sense
that they are able to understand the nature and risks of complex derivative securities, several writers have suggested that there should be
a presumption that institutions are sophisticated investors.83 Such a
presumption would have the advantage of being a clear rule, which
might have the effect of reducing the amount of litigation in this
area. It also might induce some institutional investors to retain the
services of professional investment advisers. While this author knows
of no court that has explicitly adopted the suggestion that institutional investors are presumptively sophisticated, the courts have generally been ready to find sophistication without giving adequate
weight to the complexity of the recommended securities or the impact of the skills of a salesperson on an investment officer who is reluctant to admit that he doesn’t fully understand the securities or
their risks.84

1. Rebuttable and conclusive presumptions
There are two different kinds of presumptions—rebuttable and
tions that were sold to the City Colleges by two enterprising brokers. On review, however, the
Fifth Circuit reversed this finding and absolved the brokerage firm of liability under the Texas
Securities Law, in part because “Luhmann gave every indication to [the brokers] of being a
sophisticated investor.” 230 F.3d 717, 731 n.27 (5th Cir. 2000).
83. See C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors Under the Federal Securities
Laws, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1081, 1153 (proposing a conclusive presumption that all institutions
are sophisticated); Markham, supra note 20, at 376 (asserting that any institution that is qualified as an “accredited investor” under Regulation D of the Securities Act of 1933 should be
presumed sophisticated); Roberts, supra note 20, at 804 (arguing that any public entity should
be conclusively presumed sophisticated based on its institutional capacity); see also Ass’n of the
Bar of N.Y., Report of the Committee on Securities Regulation, 53 THE RECORD 62, 96
(1998) [hereinafter Bar of N.Y.] (stating that all institutional investors should be presumed to
be “sophisticated enough to evaluate risk, seek outside financial advice or refrain from investing in complex instruments. Any other rule [would] effectively [convert] dealers into guarantors of investments.”).
84. See, e.g., Westcap II, 230 F.3d 717 (finding that the Treasurer of the City Colleges
of Chicago gave the appearance of sophistication to the two brokers who sold securities to the
institution because he had previously traded in the same derivatives that were the subject of the
dispute and because he had the use of a split-screen Bloomberg system to track the market);
Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 499, 512–17 (D. Md. 1997)
aff’d., 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 1997) (refusing to adopt a presumption that an institution is
sophisticated as a matter of law but finding that there was no material dispute as to the sophistication of the plaintiff bank’s employees).
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conclusive.85 If there were a rebuttable presumption that an institutional investor (or, alternatively, an institutional investor of a given
size) is sophisticated, the fact of sophistication would be assumed,
once the fact is established that the party in question is an institution. The institution could then rebut the presumption by introducing evidence of non-sophistication. A conclusive presumption, on
the other hand, establishes one fact (i.e., the investor is sophisticated) upon proof of another fact (i.e., the plaintiff is an institution).
A conclusive presumption is simply a rule of substantive law, which
makes the established fact irrelevant.86 Thus, a conclusive presumption that institutions (or institutions of a certain size or type) are sophisticated would simply be a rule of law that makes the question of
sophistication irrelevant.

2. A rebuttable presumption of institutional sophistication?
Rebuttable and conclusive presumptions are supported by different kinds of reasons. The reasons for creating a rebuttable presumption relate to facilitating the conduct of a trial. A rebuttable presumption may be created in order to avoid occupying the time of the
court unnecessarily on issues that are unlikely to be litigated, on
which evidence is lacking, which heavily accord with probability, or
which are difficult to prove by direct evidence.87 A conclusive presumption, on the other hand, like any other rule of substantive law,
is supported by reasons of fairness, certainty, and public policy.

85. A rebuttable presumption is a rule of evidence that states that where a basic fact has
been established, another fact will be assumed unless and until evidence has been introduced
which would support a finding of the nonexistence of such other fact. Mason Ladd, Presumptions in Civil Actions, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 277.
86. Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L. REV. 843,
846 n.16 (1981).
87. See Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1987) (“Presumptions typically
serve to assist courts in managing circumstances in which direct proof, for one reason or another, is rendered difficult.”). Justice Holmes has commented: “A presumption upon a matter
of fact, when it is not merely a disguise for some other principle, means that common experience shows the fact to be so generally true that courts may notice the truth.” Greer v. United
States, 245 U.S. 559, 561 (1918).
Professor Ladd cites five reasons for the creation of presumptions: (1) to expedite trials
on issues not likely to be litigated; (2) to avoid a procedural impasse and an undesirable result
because of the lack of evidence; (3) to weigh certain factual inferences more heavily because
they accord with probability; (4) to account for special means of access or peculiar knowledge
of the facts by one of the parties; and (5) to recognize the social desirability of the legal consequences of a particular presumed fact. Ladd, supra note 85, at 280–81.
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It is my view that proposals for a rebuttable presumption of institutional sophistication are not justified; in fact, the courts have not
adopted these proposals. A person’s degree of sophistication is not a
characteristic that lends itself to being quantified, particularly since it
must be measured in relation to the securities that the broker recommends. The numerous cases that have come up in recent years,
including the Schulte, City of San Jose, and City Colleges cases discussed in this article, in which institutions of different types and sizes
were sold unsuitable securities, suggest that any presumption of institutional sophistication does not accord with actual experience.88
The sophistication of an institution’s financial officers—that is,
their ability to understand complex securities and their risks—cannot
realistically be assumed. Aside perhaps from some professionally
managed mutual funds or pension funds,89 the financial officers of
even large institutions may be unsophisticated in terms of understanding the characteristics and risks of complex, recently invented
securities.90 Furthermore, it does not waste the time of the fact finder
to hear evidence on the issue of sophistication because that issue may
be central to determining whether a suitability claim against a broker-dealer will succeed. Nor is ascertaining the sophistication of an
institution’s financial officers a more difficult task than that of making any other factual determination; in most cases, these individuals
will be among the principal witnesses examined at the trial or arbitration hearing. The issue of sophistication may, in fact, be the most
important issue to be decided by the finder of fact.

3. A conclusive presumption of institutional sophistication?
Although institutional size is no guarantee of sophistication, the
argument has been made that even if the financial personnel of some
88. In support of his proposal for a conclusive presumption of sophistication for all institutions, Professor Fletcher quotes a statement by Dean Clark that “[i]nstitutional investors are
usually sophisticated and powerful enough to demand and get the information they need before committing their money,” but provides no other basis for this generalization. Fletcher,
supra note 83, at 1153–54.
89. Even mutual funds managers have shown that they may lack sophistication; as a result, some funds have suffered huge losses from derivatives trading. Markham, supra note 20,
at 361.
90. Although Professor Markham is in not in favor of imposing a suitability requirement
on brokers dealing with institutional investors, he concedes that “institutional investors have
established, quite conclusively, that they can seem as naive in their investments in derivative
instruments as a proverbial widow or orphan.” Id. at 358–59.
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institutions, particularly large institutions, are not sophisticated, they
should be treated as if they were. Some commentators have, therefore, proposed that there be a conclusive presumption of institutional
sophistication, regardless of whether the institution’s financial officers are actually sophisticated, on the ground that such a rule would
force institutions to hire competent, sophisticated investment managers.91 A conclusive presumption would, as a practical matter, foreclose institutional investors from making suitability claims in most
cases.92 In fact, one legal writer cuts right through the “presumption” language and simply proposes that institutions not be permitted to bring suitability claims.93 As that writer put it, the courts
should not “pierce the veil” of the prima facie sophistication of the
institution to get at the sophistication of the individual decision
makers.94 Another version of the conclusive presumption (or rule)
proposal would apply only to institutions whose assets under management exceed a certain amount.95
If all institutional investors were conclusively presumed to be sophisticated, it would be prudent and even necessary for every institution covered by the presumption to hire a professional investment
adviser. The effect of the presumption would be to shift the cost of
investigating recommended securities from the broker-dealer to the
customer. The proponents of a conclusive presumption argue, however, that allowing institutional investors to bring suitability claims
essentially guarantees them a “win-win” position when they invest in
91. Fletcher, supra note 83, at 1154 (“Although some institutions may lack sophistication in investment matters, the law should encourage them to have sophisticated parties invest
on their behalf.”); Markham, supra note 20, at 376 (“Any [brokerage] firm should be able to
assume that an institution has the ‘independent’ capability to assess the risk of its investments.”).
92. Of course, if a broker intentionally or recklessly made a material misrepresentation
to an institutional investor and the investor justifiably relied on the misrepresentation, the broker would be liable for securities fraud, quite aside from any question of suitability. However,
as I discuss later in this article, it is likely to be difficult for a sophisticated investor to prove
that any reliance it placed on a broker’s misstatement was justifiable. See infra text accompanying notes 143–96.
93. Roberts, supra note 20, at 804 (stating that courts should not allow public entities
sustaining losses in derivatives to make suitability claims).
94. Id. at 829.
95. See Goldman, supra note 20, at 1159 (suggesting that the obligations of brokerdealers selling derivatives to large institutions be “essentially restricted to disclosure,” while for
other derivatives users, “a stronger, affirmative suitability requirement should force dealers to
take some responsibility for ensuring that the customer belongs in the derivatives market and
that the particular transaction is appropriate.”).
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unsuitable high-risk securities. If the investments are successful, the
institution takes the profit; if not, the institution brings a suitability
claim, using the incompetence or lack of sophistication of its financial officers to rebut the broker’s defense that the institution was sophisticated.96

D. Institutional Sophistication and Cost Efficiency
These arguments take too little account of the realities of institutional investment and the securities markets. Many institutions, particularly small ones, would find it prohibitively expensive to hire experts familiar with the derivatives markets and the complex array of
new financial instruments in order to ensure that the institution will
be able to respond intelligently and capably in the event that a broker recommends the purchase of a risky investment. Small institutional investors are unlikely to have the financial resources to employ
investment officers who have the knowledge, training, and experience to understand the risks involved in new and complex types of
securities and whether a given investment increases or decreases the
total risk of an institution’s portfolio. Furthermore, even professional
managers are not immune from investing an institution’s funds in
unsuitable securities.97
Of course it would be desirable for all brokerage-firm customers,
including individual investors, to be diligent and knowledgeable in
handling their investments. However, even a large institutional investor such as Procter & Gamble or the State of West Virginia may find
it uneconomical to employ an entire department of specialized financial experts in order to avoid any possibility of suitability problems
arising. Because many custom-made over-the-counter derivative securities are invented by the firms that sell them, there is likely to be a
wide disparity of knowledge about these instruments between the
sellers and even the most financially acute buyers. As one municipal
financial officer testified before a congressional committee:
Regardless of the size of their portfolio or their level of sophistication, state and local government investors are unlikely to have ac-

96. Roberts, supra note 20, at 829.
97. See, e.g., In re Mitchell Hutchins Asset Mgmt., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 3439001, 1997 WL 537042 (Sept. 2, 1997) (SEC settled administrative action against brokerdealer and investment advisory firm for investing in risky derivative securities on behalf of a
fund, which fund was marketed to the public as a low-volatility investment).
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cess to either the quantity or quality of information relating to specific investment instruments that a broker-dealer has. Brokerdealers have real-time, virtually unlimited access to information,
such as pricing, structure, and risk factors of an instrument.98

In general, duties should be placed on the party who can avoid
the risk of harm at the least cost.99 Here, the question is whether it is
cheaper and more efficient to place suitability obligations on brokerdealers and to require them to police their sales personnel effectively,
on the one hand, or to require institutional investors to hire sophisticated investment officers or retain sophisticated independent investment advisers, on the other. The answer to the question may be different, depending on whether the institution is, for example, a large
mutual fund with a multi-billion-dollar portfolio or a college with an
investment portfolio of $50 million. In general, however, it is likely
to be more efficient and less costly to place the responsibility of understanding the risks of these instruments on the persons who manufactured them or who are selling them on behalf of their manufacturers than on the institutional buyers, who would be put to
considerable expense in order to assure themselves of a sufficient understanding of the instruments. As a leading jurist of our time has
stated:
[P]recautions are wasteful, and rules of law ought not induce buyers of securities to verify information that the sellers are supposed
to provide. Securities laws are designed, in large part, to compel the
person who knows firm-specific information to reveal it, and
thereby eliminate wasteful duplication of effort in digging out
facts.100

98. Testimony Before the House Commerce Comm., Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Fin., on Behalf of the Gov’t Fin. Officers Ass’n, 104th Cong. 1995 (statement of
Mark J. Saladino, Principal Deputy County Counsel, Los Angeles County, Cal.).
99. See Holtz v. J.J.B. Hilliard W.L. Lyons, Inc., 185 F.3d 732, 743 (7th Cir. 1999)
(finding broker not liable for failing to ensure that customer completed application designating
the beneficiary of his IRA account because the customer was in a better position than the broker to ensure that the application accurately reflected the customer’s intentions). Tort law
theorists have advanced the concept that the party who could avoid an accident at the lowest
cost—i.e., the cheapest cost-avoider—should bear the legal responsibility for the accident, regardless of fault. See Stephen G. Gilles, Negligence, Strict Liability, and the Cheapest CostAvoider, 78 VA. L. REV. 1291 (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
137–42 (2d ed. 1977); GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970).
100. Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1546
(7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.).
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Similarly, the “win-win” argument is unrealistic. It strains credulity to believe that an institution’s senior managers would intentionally hire “gun-slingers” or incompetents to handle its investments in
the belief that the institution will be able to recover their losses in
court or before an arbitration panel if the investments go wrong.
Sane persons do not make their business plans in that way, if only
because of the uncertainty of the outcome of the litigation and the
attorneys’ fees and other tangible and intangible litigation costs. Any
senior official or director of an institution who took that gamble
would himself be subject to liability for mismanagement. Nor is it realistic to believe that an institution’s financial officers will cynically
make risky investments knowing that their employers will be able to
bring a suitability claim if the investments are unsuccessful. In fact,
several of the financial officers of institutions that have brought suitability claims lost their jobs as soon as the losses came to light, and
some were sued or criminally prosecuted.101
Perhaps most important, if a conclusive presumption of sophistication were to apply to any entity other than a natural person (including such entities as small municipalities, churches and synagogues, school districts, estates, trusts, close corporations, and
pension plans of close corporations), the practical effect of that presumption would be to deny the protections of the securities laws and
the common law to many investors with little or no investment sophistication, because they were unable to evaluate or to resist the
sales pitch of a securities salesman. On the other hand, to adopt a
presumption of sophistication that is limited to larger institutions ignores the fact that the financial officers of even these entities may not
actually be sophisticated when it comes to complex securities such as
derivatives. Certainly, the novelty and complexity of the security
should be a factor in determining whether an institution’s investment officer should be considered sophisticated in a particular instance. However, it would be difficult to devise standards that account for the varied sizes and types of institutions that would be
excluded from the presumption.

E. Institutional Investors As Accredited Investors
Professor Markham has proposed that any institution having the

101. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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status of “accredited investor” under Regulation D of the Securities
Act of 1933 (1933 Act)102 be presumed to be sophisticated.103 In
general, issuers of securities can sell securities to an unlimited number of accredited investors and still qualify for exemption from registration under the 1933 Act.104 Furthermore, Regulation D does not
require issuers to furnish any specific information to accredited investors,105 and accredited investors need not meet the sophistication requirement of Regulation D.106 Since the term “accredited investor”
includes a bank, savings and loan institution, insurance company,
public or private pension plan with assets of over five million dollars,
small business investment company, tax-exempt organization, or
trust with assets of over five million dollars,107 Professor Markham’s
proposal would effectively bar many small institutions from bringing
suitability claims. He argues that since institutions accept the regulatory benefits of “accredited investor” status, they should not be allowed to make after-the-fact claims against brokers that they lacked
knowledge and sophistication.108
102. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501–.506 (2001).
103. As Professor Markham makes clear: “Any [brokerage] firm should be able to assume
that an institution has the ‘independent’ capability to assess the risk of its investments if that
institution has the status of an accredited investor under the federal securities laws or is an exempt institution under the Commodity Exchange Act.” Markham, supra note 20, at 376.
Regulation D exempts an issuer from registering securities under the Securities Act if
certain conditions are met. Under Rules 505 and 506, which are part of Regulation D, an offering may be made to an unlimited number of accredited investors, but to no more than
thirty-five non-accredited investors. Furthermore, certain specified information that must be
furnished to non-accredited investors need not be furnished to accredited investors. 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.502(b).
104. Under Rules 505 and 506, an issuer may sell to no more than thirty-five nonaccredited investors and to an unlimited number of accredited investors.
105. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1).
106. Rule 506 requires that each purchaser who is not an accredited investor, or his purchaser representative, have “such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters
that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment. . . .” 17
C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
107. The term “accredited investor” also includes wealthy individuals. 17 C.F.R. §
230.501(a) (2001). Rule 501 is part of Regulation D under the Securities Act, which removes
certain regulatory requirements where persons offer or sell securities to accredited investors.
The Commodity Exchange Act exempts institutional investors, including banks, trust companies, savings associations, credit unions, governmental entities, and insurance companies from
the requirement that most commodity options contracts be traded on an exchange. Markham,
supra note 20, at 355–56; see also section 207 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub.
L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1394 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78c) (defining “qualified
investor”).
108. Markham, supra note 20, at 347.
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This argument has two flaws. First, the principal purpose and result of accredited-investor status are not to confer a regulatory benefit on an institution; principally, it benefits the issuer or controlling
person of an issuer by permitting it to sell securities to institutional
investors and wealthy individuals without regard to their sophistication and without making the disclosures that it otherwise would be
required to make, either in a registration statement or other disclosure document.109 Second, accredited investor status provides an exemption only from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act; it was never meant to relieve any person from liability for defrauding an investor, however sophisticated he may be.110 Professor
Markham’s proposal goes much further than the SEC has been willing to go: it would exempt a broker-dealer from liability in a private
suit for intentionally or recklessly recommending unsuitable securities to any institution that qualifies as an accredited investor. For example, a church or school district whose total assets consist principally of real estate worth $5 million would be conclusively presumed
to be a sophisticated investor.
The SEC’s willingness to create a conclusive presumption of sophistication for most institutional investors under Regulation D was
part of the agency’s effort to assist small business capital formation.111
It was based on the premise that institutional investors and rich individuals could fend for themselves without the protections afforded
by registration because they could be expected to have sufficient
bargaining power in transactions with small issuers to ask for and obtain the information they feel is necessary to their making an informed investment decision.112 These purposes are not relevant in a
situation where a broker is selling derivatives or other complex securities to institutional investors in the secondary trading markets. Putting aside the questions of whether the SEC’s presumption of sophistication is factually justified and whether the qualifications for
being an accredited investor are set at the optimum level,113 these

109. Under Regulation D, specific disclosures are not required to be made to accredited
investors. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502(b), 230.506 (2001).
110. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2001) (preliminary note 1).
111. See Proposed Revision to Certain Exemptions, Release No. 33-6339 (Aug. 18,
1981).
112. Id.; Exemption of Limited Offers & Sales, Exchange Act Release No. 33-6121,
1979 SEC LEXIS 711, at *8–*9 (Sept. 11, 1979).
113. See MARK I. STEINBERG, SECURITIES REGULATION 157–59 (2d ed. 1993) (criticiz-
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transactions with the issuer in the more formal setting of a private
placement of securities (where the institution may itself be represented by a brokerage firm) involve a very different level of bargaining power from that enjoyed by an institutional investor in a tradingmarket transaction.

F. Sophisticated Investors Are Entitled to Protection
The foregoing discussion suggests that not all, and perhaps only
a small percentage of, institutional investors are sophisticated in any
meaningful sense, given the training, knowledge, and experience
needed to evaluate the complex securities and market strategies that
broker-dealers create and recommend to their customers. Many large
institutions undoubtedly have sophisticated investment officers, but
some do not; and many small institutions lack the resources to hire
sophisticated officers or advisers. Moreover, the Second Circuit has
held in a landmark case that even sophisticated investors deserve the
protection of the securities laws, including protection from intentionally or recklessly fraudulent conduct by securities salesment: “[A]
salesman cannot deliberately ignore that which he has a duty to
know and recklessly state facts about matters of which he is
ignorant. . . . The fact that his customers may be sophisticated and
knowledgeable does not warrant a less stringent standard.”114
Just as doctors and lawyers are liable for defrauding both their
sophisticated and unsophisticated patients and clients, brokers should
likewise not be immunized from liability because their customers are
sophisticated.115 Professor Langevoort has persuasively shown that
ing Regulation D on the ground that it gives certain investors “far less protection than they
previously had enjoyed”).
114. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); see also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Coates v. SEC,
394 U.S. 976 (1968) (“The speculators and chartists of Wall Street and Bay Street are also
‘reasonable’ investors entitled to the same legal protection afforded conservative traders.”).
115. In the settlement of an administrative action against a brokerage firm for failing reasonably to supervise a salesmen whose largest and most active customers were institutions, the
SEC stated:
[I]t was not appropriate for the firm to structure its supervision of [the salesman] in
reliance, in part, on the expectation that, because most of [his] sales and trading activities were for institutional or other large and presumably sophisticated customers,
his customers would themselves be more alert to improper sales practices than unsophisticated retail customers.
In re Howe Barnes Inv., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 37-707, 1996 WL 536517, at *4
(Sept. 23, 1996).
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brokers, whose income usually depends on a high volume of sales,
are both motivated and able to manipulate their customers’ egos in
order to sell securities:
There are methods . . . to lower both retail and institutional customers’ resistance to the sales pitch and create a desire for a particular investment, all subtly exploiting the moral hazard implicit in
every principal-agent relationship. None of these requires that the
compliant customer be unsophisticated (though he or she may be
acting imprudently). Indeed, . . . the customer’s very possession of
a degree of financial sophistication is manipulated in certain sales
techniques. Nor are customers who are effectively manipulated
likely to realize this manipulation, given their strong need to view
themselves as reasonable and responsible.
...
[O]nce a broker successfully cultivates trust, willing reliance by the
sophisticated investor—imprudent though it may seem in hindsight—is quite likely and, for that reason, alone, worthy of some
protection.116

Given the huge variety of institutional investors in terms of size,
nature, and purpose, there is no justification to presume the sophistication of an institutional financial officer or to impute sophistication
to the institution itself, either as a matter of fact, law, or public policy.

G. Suitability and Broker-Dealers’ Compensation
A compelling argument can be made that the root of the problem of unsuitable recommendations (and other abusive selling practices) is the compensation system in general use in the securities industry.117 Broker-dealers have a “temptation to oversell [when]
involved in . . . excessively large commissions.”118 The normal
method of compensation is the commission, which is based on the
price of the securities sold, not on the success of the investment. If
116. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 631. I believe that even a non-reliant plaintiff may be
entitled to protection under Rule 10b-5. See infra text accompanying notes 177–209. Nevertheless, I agree with much in Professor Langevoort’s article.
117. See, e.g., supra note 70 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 127.
118. See Anderson v. Knox, 297 F.2d 702, 722 (9th Cir. 1961) (commenting on an unsuitable recommendation by an insurance salesman).
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securities are not sold, the broker-dealer receives no compensation.
The broker (i.e., the salesperson who is employed by the brokerdealer) is in the same position, because his only compensation is a
percentage—usually between thirty and fifty percent—of the commission or markup received by the broker-dealer.119 As one financial
writer has stated, under this compensation system, “few brokers are
immune to the temptation to consider their financial self-interest
from time to time while they are advising clients. Being at once a
salesman and a counselor is too much of a burden for most mortals.”120
Furthermore, brokers are often paid more, and therefore are motivated to exert more sales pressure, for selling riskier securities or for
selling the firm’s proprietary securities. Thus, the customer may be
paying a higher commission for assuming greater risk. While it may
seem illogical and counterintuitive to charge a customer more to buy
a less desirable product, the justification that is given for this practice
is that higher commissions are necessary in order to encourage brokers to sell these investments.121 The commission system gives brokers an incentive not only to trade their customers’ accounts frequently but also to promote speculative securities, which in many
instances are not suitable for the customer.122
The motivation to sell risky securities (and not to disclose their
risk adequately) that the compensation system creates applies to sales
efforts aimed at institutional as well as individual investors. The selling-practice problems driven by the securities industry’s compensation system have thus far resisted efforts for reform.123 Institutional
finance officers, whether sophisticated or not, are often barraged by
sales pitches from their self-styled financial counselors, who are in reality highly paid and thus highly motivated salesmen and saleswomen. In addition, in many instances brokerage firms exert economic pressure on their sales staffs by imposing quotas to sell more
119. For a discussion of the commission system, see Report of the Comm. on Compensation Practices, [1995 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 85,614, at 86,508 (Apr. 10,
1995) [hereinafter Compensation Practices Report].
120. Albert Haas, Let’s Put Brokers on a Straight Salary, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1977, § 3,
at 12.
121. Ellen E. Schultz, Getting Started: Failing to Consider Commissions Can Be Costly
Error, WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1991, at C1.
122. See Robert T. Greene, Comment, Differential Commissions as a Material Fact, 34
EMORY L.J. 507 (1985).
123. See Compensation Practices Report, supra note 119, ¶ 85,614, at 86,508.
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securities and more securities of particular kinds. If the quotas are
not met, the broker may forego perks and other compensation or
may lose his or her job.124 It is unlikely that these production quotas
are ever disclosed to customers.
Any detailed discussion or critique of the compensation system
of the securities business is beyond the scope of this article. Nonetheless, in deciding whether institutional investors to whom unsuitable securities are sold should be afforded the protection of the securities laws, the powerful motivation of the broker-dealers and their
salespersons to exert pressure must be taken into account. Like the
legendary bank robber Willie Sutton, who allegedly said (or more
likely didn’t say) that he robbed banks “because that’s where the
money is,”125 brokers, whose living depends on commission income,
are naturally drawn to institutional investors. While broker-dealer
firms may have difficulty preventing their salespersons from recommending unsuitable securities, perhaps the principal reason for this
difficulty is the incentive to do so provided by the commission system.
The commissions to be earned from transactions with institutions can be enormous. For example, in the Westcap Government
Securities case, in which the City Colleges of Chicago lost $50 million, or half of its entire portfolio, as a result of its purchase of derivatives known as collateralized mortgage obligations, two salesmen
received commissions of $2.7 million from the sale of derivatives to a
single institutional customer over a period of a few months.126 Similarly, Schulte, a broker who sold unsuitable derivative securities to
thirteen small municipalities, received commissions of $400,000 on
these sales.127 Even a sophisticated financial officer may have difficulty resisting a salesperson who is not only skillful and determined

124. See Charles Gasparino, Merrill Retreats on Broker Sales Quotas For Its Financial
Foundations Program, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2000, at C23; see also POSER, BROKER-DEALER
LAW, supra note 1, § 16.01.
125. See WILLIE SUTTON, WHERE THE MONEY WAS (1976). Like many legends, the
truth of this one is subject to considerable doubt. According to one source, what Sutton actually said was that he robbed banks because “I enjoyed it. I loved it. I was more alive when I
was inside a bank, robbing it, than at any other time of my life.” Steve Cocheo, The Bank
Robber, THE QUOTE, and The Final Irony, at http:/www.banking.com/aba/profile_0397.htm (March 1997).
126. Westcap II, 230 F.3d 717, 719 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Westcap I, Case No. 9643191-H2-11, ¶ 66 at 18 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 1997).
127. In re Schulte, 1997 WL 173668, at *2–*3 (S.E.C. Apr. 10, 1997).
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but also highly motivated.
The sale of securities, even to a large institutional investor, is not
likely to resemble a typical commercial transaction between two
business entities. It is a truism that securities are not bought; they are
sold. The agents of brokerage firms who sell securities are above all
skillful professional salespersons that wage energetic campaigns to
sell their wares. The institutions targeted by these campaigns are
typically subjected to persuasive selling arguments and subtle flattery
by brokers.128 The brokers’ compensation on successful sales efforts
tends to be enormous by most standards and provides a strong incentive for aggressive sales tactics, which the financial officers of the
institutions may as a practical matter be unable to resist.129
III. THE REGULATORY AND LEGAL SOURCES OF
THE SUITABILITY REQUIREMENT
In view of the advantage that brokerage firms have over their
customers with respect to access to information and the strong incentive to oversell created by the compensation system used in the
securities industry, unsuitable recommendations are proscribed by
three types of legal or quasi-legal rules. First, the self-regulatory organizations in the securities industry, including any national securities exchange or national securities association, are required by law to
regulate their members;130 and the rules of the SROs specifically prohibit unsuitable recommendations. Although, according to the majority view of the courts, a violation of the NASD (or other SRO)
suitability rule does not give rise to criminal or civil liability,131 such a
violation can have major consequences for a broker-dealer. The
NASD has the power to fine and to bar a broker-dealer, or an individual who is associated with a broker-dealer, temporarily or perma128. See, e.g., Transcript of testimony of Arthur Robert Matthiesen, vol. 9-1441 to 91456, City of San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C 84-20601 RFP, 1991
WL 352485 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991).
129. The Schulte and Westcap cases provide examples of the substantial compensation
that securities salesmen have received through the sale of derivatives to institutional investors
are. See supra note 70 and text accompanying notes 126–27.
130. The 1934 Act provides that a national securities exchange or a national securities
association shall not be registered unless its rules “are designed to prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices [and] to promote just and equitable principles of trade.” Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6 (b)(5), 78f(b)(5), 15A(b)(6), 78o-3(b)(6).
131. See cases cited in POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 2.06[A], at 2-107
to 2-111.
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nently from the securities industry.132
Second, the antifraud rules of the federal securities laws, particularly SEC Rule 10b-5, have been interpreted to prohibit unsuitable
recommendations if intentionally or recklessly made and to subject
the broker-dealer to liability in an enforcement action by the SEC133
as well as in a private lawsuit.134
Finally, under the common law of agency, a broker who makes
such a recommendation may be liable for breach of his fiduciary duty
to his customer.135 Each of these sources of liability will now be considered.

A. Self-Regulatory Rules
1. The NASD suitability rule
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934136 (the “1934 Act” or
“Act”) contemplates that much of the regulation of broker-dealers
will be conducted by self-regulatory organizations, particularly national securities exchanges and national securities organizations. In
fact, the Act does not give the Securities and Exchange Commission
(“SEC”) general authority to adopt rules governing a broker-dealer’s
conduct in its dealings with its customers,137 but largely leaves it to

132. Nat’l Ass’n of Sec. Dealers, NASD Rule 8310(a), NASD MANUAL (CCH) 7271
(2000).
133. See In re Guevara, Exchange Act Release No. 34-42793, 2000 WL 679607 (May
18, 2000).
134. See Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc., 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1978).
135. See MidAmerica Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 886 F.2d
1249 (10th Cir. 1989).
136. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (2000).
137. The 1934 Act gives the SEC authority to regulate several specific activities of broker-dealers, including margin lending, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1994), financial responsibility, 15
U.S.C. § 78o(c)(3) (1994), and floor trading, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (1994). The only way the
SEC can regulate the conduct of broker-dealers in relation to their customers, however, is
through the SROs and through the antifraud provisions of the Act. The SEC has followed
both routes in its regulation of brokers’ unsuitable recommendations.
The proposed Federal Securities Code, developed by the American Law Institute during
the 1970s under the direction of Professor Louis Loss, would have given the SEC authority to
adopt rules to define, and to prescribe means to prevent, unfair dealings by a broker with its
customers. The proposed provision was designed “to carve out a degree of misconduct that is
more than ‘unethical,’ so that it is within the proper sphere of direct regulation rather than
self-regulation, but less than ‘fraudulent.’” AM. LAW INST., FED. SEC. CODE, PROPOSED
OFFICIAL DRAFT § 915 & n.1 (1978). The Code, however, was never enacted.
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the SROs to develop and enforce standards in this regulatory area.138
Under the Act, national securities associations are required to be
registered with the SEC, and almost all broker-dealers are required
to be members of a national securities association. The only national
securities association ever to be registered with the SEC is the National Association of Securities Dealers. The 1934 Act requires the
NASD to establish and enforce rules “to promote just and equitable
principles of trade” in the securities industry.139 Pursuant to its statutory mandate, the NASD adopted its suitability rule not long after
the NASD was established in 1939.140 The rule, which is now designated as Rule 2310, states in part:
(a) In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a member shall have reasonable grounds for
believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer
upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such customer as to
his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and
needs.141

The NASD’s suitability rule is one of the principal components
of the standards of fair dealing and professional conduct that are applicable to a stockbroker when dealing with a customer.142 Although
misrepresentations or nondisclosure of information may accompany a
violation of the suitability rule, the rule itself is a substantive requirement that imposes on a broker-dealer “an obligation not to
recommend a course of action clearly contrary to the best interests of
the customer, whether or not there was full disclosure.”143

138. The NASD is the only national securities association. There are nine active national
securities exchanges, the largest of which is the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). SEC, 2000
ANNUAL REPORT 38, 145–55 (2001).
139. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1994).
140. SEC REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. NO. 95, at
228 (1963) [hereinafter SEC SPECIAL STUDY].
141. NASD Rule 2310, supra note 1, at 4261. Before the NASD recodified its rules in
1996, the suitability rule was Article III, section 2 of the NASD’s Rules of Fair Practice.
142. Although the majority view is that a violation of an SRO rule, including the suitability rule, does not give rise to a private right of action, such violations may be taken into account in determining whether a broker acted reasonably and in accord with the prevailing
standards of the securities industry. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th
Cir. 1981).
143. In re Powell & McGowan, 41 S.E.C. 933, Exchange Act Release No. 7302, 1964
WL 66868 (Apr. 24, 1964).
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By its terms, Rule 2310 applies only to recommendations. The
rule is not implicated where a broker sells to a customer a nonrecommended security. This raises the question of what constitutes a
recommendation. In 1996, the NASD stated that it would deem a
transaction to be “recommended” when a broker “brings a specific
security to the attention of the customer through any means, including, but not limited to, direct telephone communication, the delivery
of promotional material through the mail, or the transmission of
electronic messages.”144 Subsequently, the staff of NASD Regulation,
Inc., the NASD’s regulatory subsidiary, qualified this broad definition of the term “recommend” by stating that a suitability obligation
does not apply in situations where the broker acts solely as an ordertaker, that every statement that mentions a security would not necessarily be considered a recommendation, and that the term “recommended” does not depend on whether an order was deemed “solicited or unsolicited.”145 The SEC takes the position that the NASD
rule is violated even where the broker makes an unsuitable recommendation in response to the customer’s expressed wish to speculate
in the market. As a fiduciary, a broker may only make recommendations that are in the best interests of his customer, even when the
recommendations contradict the customer’s wishes.146 However,
there is no bright-line test as to what constitutes a recommendation
for purposes of Rule 2310, but rather a spectrum of situations, from
a broker acting merely as an order-taker, at the one extreme, and the
urging by a broker of a customer to buy a particular security, at the
other. In between are a variety of situations in which it may not be
entirely clear whether or not the rule applies.
Although misrepresentations or nondisclosure of information
may accompany a violation of the NASD suitability rule, the rule itself is a substantive requirement that imposes on a broker-dealer “an
obligation not to recommend a course of action clearly contrary to
144. NASD Notice to Members No. 96-60, 1996 NASD LEXIS 76 (Sept. 1996). In
2001, the NASD published a “policy statement” advising its members as to the kinds of communications over the Internet that constituted “recommendations” under Rule 2310. Online
Suitability, NASD Notice to Members No. 01-23, 2001 WL 278614 (Mar. 19, 2001).
145. See N.Y. COUNTY LAWYERS’ ASS’N, STRATEGIES FOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS IN
THE NEW E-COMMERCE ECONOMY 5–6 (Jan. 19, 2000).
146. In re Reynolds, [1991–92 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,901, at
82,311 (SEC Dec. 4, 1991) (holding that broker violated NASD suitability rule where he engaged in aggressive and speculative trading on behalf of church fund, even if the church board
did suggest that he engage in this type of trading).
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the best interests of the customer, whether or not there was full disclosure.”147 Unlike Rule 10b-5, the principal antifraud rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission, NASD Rule 2310, does not require that the brokerage firm act with scienter (i.e., intent or
recklessness).148 A broker who recommends the purchase or sale of a
security to a customer without having a reasonable belief that it is
suitable may be sanctioned by the NASD for acting negligently.149
Because of the inclusive membership of the NASD and perhaps
also because the NASD rule was the earliest suitability rule to be
adopted by any regulator, the rule has been highly influential in the
development of the doctrine. Nevertheless, although violation of the
NASD suitability rule (or any other SRO rule) subjects a brokerdealer to possible disciplinary action, the majority view of the courts
is that no private right of action can be implied from such a violation.150 Rules such as NASD Rule 2310, however, are admissible, in
lawsuits and arbitrations based on negligence or breach of fiduciary

147. In re Powell & McGowan, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 933, 1964 WL 66868, at *2 (1964).
148. Erdos v. SEC, 742 F.2d, 507, 508 (9th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court held in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), that a defendant cannot violate section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 unless he acts with scienter.
149. Professor Mundheim has pointed out that the suitability doctrine is closely related
to section 2-315 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which provides that a seller of goods
makes an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, where the seller has reason to
know the particular purpose for which the goods are acquired and where the buyer relies on
the seller’s skill or judgment in selecting or furnishing goods which are suitable for that purpose. Mundheim, supra note 2, at 452. Article 2 of the code, however, applies only to sales of
goods, not to sales of securities.
150. The courts are divided on the question of whether an SRO violation can give rise to
an implied private right of action, but the prevailing view on this question is negative. See
Jablon v. Dean Witter & Co., 614 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1980) (no implied private right of action
for violation of an SRO rule). But see Buttrey v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
410 F.2d 135, 142 (7th Cir. 1969) (private right of action for violation of an SRO rule may be
implied if the defendant’s conduct was tantamount to fraud); see also cases cited in POSER,
BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 2.06[A], at 2-107 to 2-111.
The majority view on this question has been sharply criticized by the California intermediate appellate court:
It may be asserted the proposed [suitability] guidelines are merely ethical standards
and should not be a predicate for civil liability. Good ethics should not be ignored
by the law. It would be inconsistent to suggest that a person should be defrocked as
a member of his calling, and yet not be liable for the injury which resulted from his
acts or omissions.
Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 244 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968);
see also LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 834 (2d ed. 1988).
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duty, as evidence of the standard of conduct that should be applied
to members of the securities industry.151

2. Recommendations to institutional customers under the NASD
rule
Rule 2310 applies to recommendations made to institutional as
well as individual customers, although not in exactly the same manner. Although Part (a) of the rule, which is quoted above, by its
terms applies to all customers, Part (b) applies only to individual customers. Part (b) requires a broker, when recommending a security to
a non-institutional customer, to make reasonable efforts to obtain
information concerning the customer’s financial status, tax status, investment objectives, and any other information that the broker considers to be reasonable.152
The NASD has made it clear that Part (a) of the rule does not
implicitly exempt from its requirements recommendations made to
institutional customers. In 1996, the NASD adopted an interpretation of its suitability rule (the “Suitability Interpretation”) that defines the suitability obligations of brokerage firms to institutional
customers.153 The NASD considers an institutional customer to be
any entity other than a natural person, but suggests that the Suitability Interpretation should normally be applied only to institutions
with at least $10 million invested in securities.154
The NASD’s Suitability Interpretation limits, but does not eliminate, the responsibility of a broker to determine the suitability of its
recommendations to an institutional customer. Under the interpretation, the extent of the responsibility depends upon the investment
sophistication of the customer and the nature and circumstances of
the relationship between the broker and customer. The broker must
determine the suitability of a recommended investment unless the

151. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981).
152. Twenty-five years before the NASD adopted Part (b) of Rule 2310, the SEC had
held that the suitability rule imposed an implied duty on a NASD member to investigate its
customers’ situation before it recommended securities to the customer. In re Greenberg, 40
S.E.C. 133 (1960); see also Erdos, 742 F.2d at 508.
153. NASD Rule 2310-3, supra note 35, at 4265.
154. Id. The NASD does not explain why it determined that the cutoff should be $10
million. Presumably, the determination was based on the assumption that an institutional investor with a securities portfolio of under that amount is unlikely to be able to afford professional financial management.
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broker is satisfied that the customer has both a general capability to
evaluate investment risks and a specific capability to evaluate the risks
of a particular investment.155 If the broker has reasonable grounds for
concluding that an institutional customer is making independent investment decisions and is capable of independently evaluating investment risk, the member’s obligation to determine that a recommendation is suitable is fulfilled. Where an institutional customer has
delegated decision-making authority to an agent, such as an investment advisor or a bank trust department, the broker-dealer must determine the ability of the agent to evaluate the investment risk.
Thus, a broker’s suitability obligation to an institutional customer is narrower than to an individual customer, for whom the
broker is required to determine the suitability of any investment that
it recommends, regardless of the customer’s investment sophistication. A possible explanation for the difference in approach is that
since institutional investors are likely to be under professional management, there is no need to burden a broker-dealer with a suitability responsibility once the broker-dealer has determined that the institutional manager is capable of independently evaluating the
recommended securities.156 Although this argument is also plausible
155. The Suitability Interpretation states in part:
The two most important considerations in determining the scope of a member’s
suitability obligations in making recommendations to an institutional customer are
the customer’s capability to evaluate investment risk independently and the extent to
which the customer is exercising independent judgment in evaluating a member’s
recommendation. A member must determine, based on the information available to
it, the customer’s capability to evaluate investment risk. In some cases, the member
may conclude that the customer is not capable of making independent investment
decisions in general. In other cases, the institutional customer may have general capability, but may not be able to understand a particular type of instrument or its
risk. This is more likely to arise with relatively new types of instruments, or those
with significantly different risk or volatility characteristics than other investments
generally made by the institution. If a customer is either generally not capable of
evaluating investment risk or lacks sufficient capability to evaluate the particular
product, the scope of a member’s customer-specific obligations under the suitability
rule would not be diminished by the fact that the member was dealing with an institutional customer. On the other hand, the fact that a customer initially needed help
understanding a potential investment need not necessarily imply that the customer
did not ultimately develop an understanding and make an independent investment
decision.
Id. at 4264.
156. The Interpretation provides that, in determining the institutional customer’s (or
agent’s) capability to evaluate investment risk, the broker should consider the following factors:
(1) The customer’s use of consultants, investment advisors, or bank trust depart-
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where a broker-dealer recommends securities to a sophisticated individual investor, the NASD rule does not limit a broker-dealer’s responsibility in the same way in that situation.
Despite the more limited application of the NASD suitability rule
to institutional investors, the Suitability Interpretation makes it clear
that a broker’s obligation to determine the suitability of recommendations applies to recommendations made to institutional as well as
individual investors.

3. Suitability and the professional status of the securities industry
The NASD’s position in this area is not unrelated to the fact that
broker-dealers wish to gain professional status as advisors, equivalent
to that of a doctor, lawyer, or accountant. Brokerage firms seek to
encourage customers to believe that their salespersons are professionals upon whom the customers can rely for expert investment advice. This is made patently clear by their advertising, which emphasizes that brokerage firms can be trusted to give investment advice,
designating their salespersons as “financial consultants,” “financial
advisors,” or “account executives”; and in other ways in their customer contacts.157 Brokers seek the trust and confidence not only of
individuals but of institutional investors as well.158 Clearly, the NASD

ments.
(2) The customer’s general level of experience in financial markets and specific experience with the type of investment under consideration.
(3) The customer’s ability to understand the economic features of the security.
(4) The customer’s ability to independently evaluate how market developments
would affect the security.
(5) The complexity of the security.
The Suitability Interpretation states that the above factors are guidelines and that the
presence or absence of any of them is not dispositive of the determination of suitability. “Such
a determination can only be made on a case-by-case basis taking into consideration all the facts
and circumstances of a particular member/customer relationship, assessed in the context of a
particular transaction.” Id. at 4265.
157. A review of the web sites of several brokerage firms shows that they encourage the
public to depend on them for investment advice. Typical slogans are “Advising Investors for
Over a Century” (Legg Mason), “Your Guide to the Financial World” (First Union Securities), “We Help You Invest Responsibly” (Fidelity Investments), “We want your business, we’ll
earn your trust” (Ferris Baker Watts), and “We Measure Success One Investor at a Time”
(Morgan Stanley).
Titles such as “financial advisor” or “financial consultant” “are pregnant with important
legal meaning,” since they invite the customer to enter into a relationship of “trust, confidence
and dependence” with the broker. Rapp, supra note 3, at 190 n.3.
158. Paine Webber, for example, provides consulting services to institutions and wealthy
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considers the suitability requirement a requisite of the professional
status to which the securities industry aspires. The Suitability Interpretation recognizes that when a suitability obligation is imposed on
a broker, it means that this aspiration is being taken seriously.
The Suitability Interpretation identifies the institutional customers to which a brokerage firm owes a suitability duty on the basis of
the investment sophistication of the institution’s financial officers. It
accurately reflects the reality, which has been ignored by some courts
and legal writers, that many institutional investors lack both sophistication and the financial resources to hire sophisticated financial officers. At the same time, the interpretation relieves a broker-dealer of
any responsibility for the suitability of the recommendations that it
makes, once the broker-dealer has satisfied itself that the financial officer is capable of evaluating the broker’s recommendations. In view
of the public responsibilities of broker-dealers and the difficulty in
determining whether an institution is sophisticated, this is questionable public policy, to which I will return later in this article.159

4. Suitability rules of other SROs
Most securities-industry SROs have suitability rules, but these
rules have neither the importance nor the influence of the NASD
rule. The Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (“MSRB”), which
is the SRO established by the SEC pursuant to its authority under
the 1934 Act to regulate the activities of dealers in municipal securities,160 has a suitability rule similar to the NASD rule. The MSRB
rule places an affirmative duty of inquiry on the dealer with respect

individuals. Among the services it offers are “asset allocation advice and the evaluation, recommendation and ongoing analysis of investment managers.” UBS/PaineWebber, Corporate
& Institutional Services Homepage, at http://www.ubspaineWebber.com/index.html (last
visited Nov. 12, 2001).
159. For a favorable comment on the NASD’s Suitability Interpretation, suggesting that
the Interpretation is applicable not only in NASD disciplinary actions but also in resolving disputes between institutions and brokers, see Wallance & Carron, supra note 20, at 1.
Although these guidelines are not intended to provide a “safe harbor” for dealers
who sell securities to institutional customers, they provide a balanced and realistic
framework for resolving suitability disputes between institutional customers and
their brokers. Their most innovative feature is the recognition that an institutional
investor that can evaluate the risks of its investments and make independent decisions is in a better position than a broker to judge the suitability of its investments.
Id. at 1 (footnote omitted).
160. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4 (1994).
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to recommendations to non-institutional accounts. In addition, a
dealer is required to make a suitability determination before recommending a municipal security transaction to (or exercising discretion
on behalf of) any account, including an institutional account.161
The New York Stock Exchange does not have a general suitability rule, but the exchange’s “know your customer” rule requires
member firms to use “due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to every customer [and] every order.”162 Although this rule was
originally designed to protect stock exchange members from dishonest or insolvent customers, it is presently regarded as protecting investors from being induced to purchase securities whose risks they
can ill afford.163 The NYSE “leaves to the member organization’s
judgment the determination of which facts are ‘essential’ in the varying circumstances of each new account.”164 By its terms, the “know
your customer” rule applies to institutional as well as individual accounts, and to transactions initiated by a customer as well as transactions recommended by the broker.165
Because of the complexity and special risks inherent in put and
call options, the SROs on which options are traded have adopted
special suitability rules for customers’ option accounts.166 Institutional customers are not excluded from the rules’ coverage. These
rules require that a broker, in recommending an “opening transaction” (i.e., a transaction that establishes or increases the customer’s
long or short position in an option), must have a reasonable basis for
believing “that the customer has such knowledge and experience in
financial matters that he may reasonably be expected to be capable of
evaluating the risks of the recommended transaction, and is finan161. Mun. Sec. Rulemaking Bd., MSRB Rule G-19, MSRB MANUAL (CCH) ¶ 3591
(1994).
162. N.Y. Stock Exchange, NYSE Rule 405, NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 3696 (2000).
163. LOUIS LOSS, “FRAUD” AND CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES
LAWS 31 (1983); Sam Scott Miller & Robert D. Popper, Discount Brokers’ Obligations Under
the “Suitability” Doctrine, 5 No. 11 INSIGHTS 7 (Nov. 1991).
164. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE, PATTERNS OF SUPERVISION 41 (1982).
165. A booklet prepared by the NYSE to assist its members in fulfilling their supervisory
responsibilities lists thirty-one items of information that “may be included in the new account
form of an institutional client, if deemed ‘essential’ for the particular account.” Id. at 44.
166. Options have been a popular form of investment since 1973, when trading in standardized listed options commenced on the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE). For a
description of the listed options market, see Poser, supra note 62, at 585–92. Curiously, the
SROs have not adopted special suitability rules for the sale of derivatives (other than options).
However the NASD Suitability Interpretation may be considered to be such a rule.
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cially able to bear the risks of the recommended position in the option contract.”167 Thus, the SROs’ suitability rules expressly require
that opening options transactions be recommended only to customers with sufficient investment sophistication.
In conclusion, it may be said that although the suitability rules of
the NASD and other SROs, and the NYSE’s “know your customer
rule,” do not give rise to a private cause of action, these rules have
established standards of conduct for the securities industry, which are
relevant in lawsuits brought for violation of SEC Rule 10b-5 or for
breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, the NASD’s Suitability Interpretation
is likely to have an influence on courts and arbitrators in determining
whether a broker should be liable for recommending an unsuitable
security to an institutional investor.

B. Suitability Under Rule 10b-5
Rule 10b-5 is the general antifraud rule of the SEC. It prohibits
deceptive conduct and misstatements and omissions of material fact
by any person, if the conduct is in connection with the purchase or
sale of a security.168 Although Rule 10b-5 does not expressly give a
private plaintiff a cause of action, the Supreme Court has held that
there is an implied private right of action based on a violation of the
rule.169 In order to establish liability under 10b-5, it is not enough
for a plaintiff to prove that the defendant violated the NASD (or
other SRO) suitability rule; the plaintiff must prove all the required
elements of a 10b-5 violation. These elements are: (1) a misstatement or omission, or other fraudulent device; (2) a purchase or sale
of a security in connection with the fraud; (3) scienter (i.e., intentional or reckless conduct) by the defendant; (4) materiality of the
misstated or omitted fact; (5) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and
(6) damage resulting from the misstatement, omission, or fraudulent
device.170

167. See N.Y. Stock Exchange, NYSE Rule 723, NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 4561 (1999); see
also Chicago Board Options Exchange R. 9.9, CBOE CONSTITUTION AND RULES (CCH)
2140 (1999).
168. For the text of Rule 10b-5, see supra note 8.
169. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 380 (1983) (“[A] private
right of action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 has been consistently recognized for more than 35 years. The existence of this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure.”).
170. See Platsis v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 946 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1991).
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The federal courts have held for over twenty years that a broker’s
unsuitable recommendation to a customer may constitute a violation
of Rule 10b-5. In 1978, in Clark v. John Lamula Investors, Inc.,171
the Second Circuit held that a broker’s intentional recommendation
of an unsuitable security to an individual customer was “an act, practice or course of business which [operated] as a fraud or deceit”
upon the customer, in violation of subsection (c) of Rule 10b-5. The
Clark court held that, in order to establish a 10b-5 claim for unsuitability, the customer must prove that (1) the recommended securities were unsuitable for her even though the broker knew or reasonably assumed that the securities were unsuitable; (2) the broker
intended for the customer to rely on his recommendation; and (3)
the customer relied on the broker’s recommendation.172
Clark did not explicitly deal with the question of how an unsuitable recommendation satisfies the requirement of Rule 10b-5 that, in
order to violate the rule, there must be a misstatement, omission, or
other fraudulent device.173 Later federal cases, however, have
adopted two alternative theories of liability in suitability cases.174 The
first theory is that the broker misrepresented to his customer that the
recommended security was suitable or (owing a duty to disclose)
failed to disclose to the customer that the recommendation was unsuitable.175 The second theory is that the broker engaged in fraud by

171. 583 F.2d 594, 599 (2d Cir. 1978).
172. Id. at 598. See In re Richards, Case No. 4-88-04402 TS6 Chapter 7, 1990 Bankr.
LEXIS 607, at *17 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 1990).
173. The Supreme Court held in Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977),
that deception was an essential element of a violation of Rule 10b-5: “Thus,” the Court ruled,
“the claim of fraud and fiduciary breach in this complaint states a cause of action under any
part of Rule 10b-5 only if the conduct alleged can be fairly viewed as ‘manipulative or deceptive’ within the meaning of the statute.” Id. at 473–74. The Supreme Court subsequently held
that conduct cannot be manipulative unless it also is deceptive. See Schreiber v. Burlington
Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
174. See O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992); City of San
Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C 84-20601 RFP, 1991 WL 352485 (N.D.
Cal. June 6, 1991).
175. Under this theory, the broker is liable because he made a misstatement of, or omitted to state, a material fact. An omission of a material fact gives rise to liability if the omission
makes an otherwise truthful statement misleading. See Rule 10b-5(2). Even if the broker made
no statement at all to the customer, his omission to disclose the unsuitability of a recommended security may be the basis for liability if the broker had a duty to speak—a duty that
arose from the relationship of trust and confidence between broker and customer. Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 230–31 (1980). Such a duty may arise from the existence of a
fiduciary relationship. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 654–55 (1983).
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his conduct, because recommending a security to a customer with
the knowledge that it is unsuitable, or with reckless disregard for its
suitability, is an inherently deceptive act and constitutes a “device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud” the customer, or an “act, practice, or
course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit” on the customer.176 Institutional investors, however, have not
had much success in asserting suitability claims under either of these
two theories of liability.

1. The misrepresentation/omission theory of liability: The problem
of justifiable reliance
An institutional investor who claims that a broker-dealer misrepresented (or failed to disclose) the unsuitability of the securities that
it sold to the institution must prove that it justifiably relied on the
misrepresentation or omission. Under the majority view of the
courts, the plaintiff, whether an individual or an institution, must
show not only that it actually relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation or omission, but also that the reliance was justifiable. In order
to recover, the plaintiff must demonstrate that it exercised due care
and reasonable diligence in ascertaining the truth about the investment.177 Even an unsophisticated investor may not be able to overcome this requirement,178 but for a sophisticated investor the requirement is likely to be insuperable.
A 10b-5 unsuitability claim that is based on the “misrepresentation/omission” theory is considered to be a subset of an ordinary
176. See Rule 10b-5(a) and (c); see also O’Connor, 965 F.2d at 897.
177. Brown v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 991 F.2d 1020, 1030–31 (2d Cir. 1993); Myers
v. Finkle, 950 F.2d 165, 167 (4th Cir. 1991); Laird v. Integrated Res., Inc., 897 F.2d 826,
837–38 (5th Cir. 1990); Bruschi v. Brown, 876 F.2d 1526, 1529 (11th Cir. 1989); Kennedy
v. Josephthal & Co., 814 F.2d 798, 805 (1st Cir. 1987); Molecular Tech. Corp. v. Valentine,
925 F.2d 910, 918 (6th Cir. 1991).
178. In E.F. Hutton, several presumably unsophisticated, income-oriented customers
sought to recover losses suffered as a result of purchasing risky limited partnership interests,
asserting that these securities were unsuitable for them. The court affirmed the district court’s
dismissal of the action on the ground that the plaintiffs’ reliance on the defendants’ oral misstatements was not justifiable as a matter of law, because the plaintiffs had been provided with
a prospectus that contained accurate written disclosures of the risks of the investment. E.F.
Hutton, 991 F.2d at 1032.
Other circuits, however, have held that, depending on the circumstances, a plaintiff’s reliance on oral misrepresentations may be reasonable even where the misrepresentations were
contradicted by contemporaneous written disclosures. See Myers, 950 F.2d at 167–69 (4th
Cir. 1991); Bruschi, 876 F.2d at 1529–30 (11th Cir. 1989).
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misrepresentation or omission claim under the rule.179 A plaintiff
who brings such an action must plead and prove that (1) the recommended securities (or securities purchased for a discretionary account) were unsuited to the investor’s needs; (2) the defendant knew
or reasonably believed that the securities were unsuitable; (3) the defendant, with scienter, recommended (or purchased for the customer) the securities anyway; (4) the defendant made a misstatement
of (or, owing a duty to the plaintiff, failed to disclose) material information; and (5) the plaintiff justifiably relied to its detriment on
the defendant’s fraudulent conduct.180
In a suitability lawsuit brought by an institutional investor based
on the misrepresentation/omission theory, a major roadblock to establishing liability under Rule 10b-5 is the need to prove that the
plaintiff’s reliance was justifiable.181 The rule requiring justifiable reliance by the plaintiff is said to be based on two policy reasons: first,
that only those who have pursued their own interests with care and
good faith should qualify for the judicially created 10b-5 remedies;
and, second, that requiring plaintiffs to invest carefully promotes the
antifraud policies of the federal securities laws and engenders stability
in the markets.182
Although the federal circuits have defined the standard for determining whether the plaintiff’s reliance was justifiable in different
ways, the prevailing standard is, at least ostensibly, one of recklessness, i.e., “whether the plaintiff . . . refused to investigate in disre179. Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1032 (4th Cir.
1997); City of San Jose, 1991 WL 352485, at *2.
180. E.F. Hutton, 991 F.2d at 1031.
181. The justifiable reliance requirement applies to any misrepresentation claim brought
under Rule 10b-5, not only to a suitability claim. The courts are not unanimous, however, in
imposing a duty of inquiry on the plaintiff. See Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt
Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1546 (7th Cir. 1990) (disallowing the securities buyer recovery
unless it has tried to verify the seller’s statements would impede the disclosure objective of the
securities laws).
The justifiable reliance requirement can, alternatively, be viewed as a materiality requirement. In other words, defendant’s misstatements “were such obvious hooey that no reasonable investor would have been taken in,” or would have viewed the defendant’s misstatements or omissions “as altering the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Astor
Chauffered Limousine, 910 F.2d at 1546 (citing TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S.
438, 449 (1976)); see also Westcap II, 230 F.3d 717, 727–33 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding no
10b-5 liability because defendant’s prediction of future trend of interest rates was not a material misstatement, and defendant’s failure to warn plaintiff about risk was not a material omission).
182. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1014 (5th Cir. 1977).
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gard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to
have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that
harm would follow.”183 Since the Supreme Court has held that the
defendant in a 10b-5 action can be liable only if he acted with scienter (i.e., either intentionally or recklessly),184 it would be anomalous to bar a plaintiff from recovery if his conduct rose only to the
level of negligence. Nevertheless, some of the cases appear to apply a
negligence standard to the plaintiff. Thus, some courts, instead of
requiring that the plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendant’s misrepresentation, have instead framed the requirement as one requiring
that the plaintiff exercise “due diligence” in handling her investments. The due diligence standard, somewhat confusingly, can be
interpreted as either one of recklessness or negligence.185
In Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc.,186 a leading case on the subject of the
plaintiff’s reliance requirement under Rule 10b-5, the Tenth Circuit
stated: “Only when the plaintiff’s conduct rises to a level of culpable
conduct comparable to that of the defendant’s will reliance be unjustifiable. In this circuit, such conduct must amount to at least reckless
behavior.”187 The court listed the following “relevant factors” for determining whether reliance was justifiable:
(1) the sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and
securities matters; (2) the existence of long standing business or
personal relationships; (3) access to the relevant information; (4)
the existence of a fiduciary relationship; (5) concealment of the
fraud; (6) the opportunity to detect the fraud; (7) whether the

183. Laird v. Integrated Res., Inc., 897 F.2d 826, 837 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Stephenson v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., 839 F.2d 1095, 1098 (5th Cir. 1988); Dupuy,
551 F.2d at 1020)); see also Zobrist v. Coal-X, Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1517 (10th Cir. 1983)
(“At a minimum, though, ‘a plaintiff may not reasonably or justifiably rely on a misrepresentation where its falsity is palpable.’”) (quoting Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th
Cir. 1976)). For a comprehensive rundown of the cases on plaintiff’s reliance in a 10b-5 action, see WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 55, § 4.1 n.11.
184. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
185. See Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885 F.2d 1011, 1015–16 (2d
Cir. 1989) (“A showing of reliance may be defeated . . . where defendant establishes that plaintiff should have discovered the true facts. This has been called the due diligence test, to which,
traditionally, a negligence standard has applied. . . . [H]owever, the degree of diligence to
which plaintiffs are held has been diminished to minimal diligence. More specifically, a plaintiff
bears only the burden of negating his own ‘recklessness,’ once the issue of diligence is raised by
defendant.”) (citations omitted); see also Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1014.
186. 708 F.2d 1511 (10th Cir. 1983).
187. Id. at 1516 (citations omitted).
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plaintiff initiated the stock transaction or sought to expedite the
transaction; and (8) the generality or specificity of the misrepresentations.188

However, the court diluted the usefulness of its list of factors by
adding the comment that “[n]o single factor is determinative; all
relevant factors must be considered and balanced to determine
whether reliance was justified.”189
The majority view is that the plaintiff has the burden of proving
that its reliance was justifiable (or that it performed due diligence).190
The test of whether the reliance is justifiable is said to be a subjective
one, based on whether it would be justifiable for an investor with the
attributes of the plaintiff, rather than the average investor.191 The
first of the Zobrist list of relevant factors, the plaintiff’s sophistication, is probably the most important in a 10b-5 suitability case because a reasonable person who is a sophisticated investor may be expected to investigate the risks of each security that a broker
recommends to it.192 Consequently, it is unlikely that any reliance by
a sophisticated investor on the broker’s misrepresentation would be
justifiable.193 If investment officers of institutions are presumed to be
sophisticated, then institutions cannot bring a successful 10b-5 action unless they can overcome the presumption. If the presumption
is deemed to be a conclusive one, they cannot succeed under any circumstances.

188. Id.
189. Id. at 1516–17.
190. See Jackvony v. RIHT Fin. Corp., 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989); Harsco Corp. v.
Segui, 91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996); Sowell v. Butcher, 926 F.2d 289 (3d Cir. 1991); Cooke v.
Manufactured Homes, Inc., 998 F.2d 1256 (4th Cir. 1993); Schlesinger v. Herzog, 2 F.3d
135 (5th Cir. 1993); Wright v. Nat’l Warranty Co., 953 F.2d 256 (6th Cir. 1992); Grubb v.
FDIC, 868 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1989); Ross v. Bank S., N.A., 885 F.2d 723 (11th Cir.
1989).
191. Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1016 (5th Cir. 1977).
192. One court has stated that a plaintiff’s reliance will not be presumed to be unreasonable just because the plaintiff was a sophisticated investor, but that the plaintiff’s knowledge
and experience will be examined in light of the defendant’s misrepresentations and omissions.
Nye v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 588 F.2d 1189, 1197 (8th Cir. 1978).
193. “[T]he most relevant [of the Zobrist factors] to a suitability claim would seem to be
the sophistication and expertise of the plaintiff in financial and securities matters, the existence
of ‘longstanding business or personal relationships,’ the existence of a fiduciary relationship,
the opportunity to detect the fraud, and the generality or specificity of the misrepresentations.”
Bar of N.Y., supra note 83, at 88.
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Because the private right of action under section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 was not in the legislative enactment but was subsequently implied by the courts, Congress did not indicate whether reliance (let
alone justifiable reliance) by the plaintiff was an essential element of
the cause of action.194 The courts have overwhelmingly held that a
plaintiff must have justifiably relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations or omissions or, alternatively, that the plaintiff acted with due
diligence in the handling of its investments.195 This requirement is
troubling, since, as described above, many courts seem to equate due
diligence with non-negligent conduct. Moreover, the justifiable reliance requirement, as so interpreted, is inconsistent both with the
common law of torts and with the investment-protection purpose of
the federal securities laws.196 “At common law, contributory negligence [has never been] a defense to an intentional tort, on the
ground that D’s purpose to harm and P’s failure to take protection
were wrongs of a wholly different order.”197 Under comparative negligence principles, which now operate in nearly every state, a plaintiff’s negligence may be used by the defendant to mitigate damages,
even where the defendant acted recklessly, but is not a complete bar
to recovery.
194. The “justifiable reliance” requirement, like the other elements of the private right of
action under Rule 10b-5, derives from the common law tort of deceit. See LOUIS LOSS &
JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 846 (4th ed. 2000).
Although the courts have uniformly held that reliance by the plaintiff is an essential element of a 10b-5 claim, the Supreme Court has attempted to ease the difficulties of proving
reliance. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1971), the Court held
that where a 10b-5 violation involves “primarily a failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance
is not a prerequisite to recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material. . . .”
Thus, it would appear that a plaintiff claiming that a broker failed to inform it that recommended securities were unsuitable would not be required to prove reliance. Nevertheless, very
few of the suitability cases discussing the question of justifiable reliance contain any reference
to Affiliated Ute. See cases cited supra note 177. But see Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Paine,
Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 639 F. Supp. 108, 113 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (noting that Affiliated Ute requires the court to assume reliance if there were material omissions).
195. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1014.
196. In Dupuy, the court recognized that the relevant policies behind tort law and the
federal securities laws are similar: to deter intentional misconduct, to protect investors against
fraud, and to promote ethical standards of honesty and fair dealing in the securities markets.
Id. at 1018–19.
197. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 212 (1999). In fact, even where the defendant was
merely negligent almost all of the states have abandoned contributory negligence in favor of a
system of comparative negligence. Id. at 211. Thus, in a negligence case, a plaintiff who was
negligent may be entitled to some recovery whereas, anomalously, a negligent plaintiff who
was the victim of an intentional securities fraud is likely to be denied any recovery.
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Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are antifraud provisions, under
which there can be no liability unless the defendant acted with scienter, i.e., intentionally or recklessly.198 As Judge Easterbrook has
stated: “[S]ecurities fraud is an intentional tort, and . . . contributory
negligence (failure to investigate independently) is not a defense
when the tort is intentional.”199 If a negligent victim of a defendant’s
negligent conduct can recover, a negligent victim of a fraud certainly
should not be barred from recovery. According to the Restatement:
“The recipient of a fraudulent misrepresentation of fact is justified in
relying upon its truth, although he might have ascertained the falsity
of the representation had he made an investigation.”200 The majority
of jurisdictions have held the plaintiff’s negligence should not defeat
a fraud claim and that the plaintiff is not required to conduct a due
diligence investigation when the misrepresentation concerned matters peculiarly within the defendant’s knowledge.201 Two principal
reasons have been cited for this rule: first, the policy of deterring intentional misconduct outweighs the policy of deterring negligent
behavior; and, second, considerations of equity dictate that where
one party is more culpable than the other, the more culpable party
should bear the loss.202 Nevertheless, decisions interpreting Rule
10b-5 deny recovery to a negligent plaintiff who is victimized by a
defendant acting with intent to defraud or recklessly, although
“[b]oth tort law and federal securities policy support imposing on
the plaintiff only a standard of care not exceeding that imposed on
the defendant.”203
It is at least debatable whether a 10b-5 plaintiff should be limited
by common law precepts. While traditional tort law can supply some
guidance to the courts when interpreting the federal securities laws,
the courts are not bound by it. The Supreme Court has stated that
the securities laws were enacted “to rectify perceived deficiencies in
the available common law protections by establishing higher stan198. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
199. Astor Chauffeured Limousine Co. v. Runnfeldt Inv. Corp., 910 F.2d 1540, 1546
(7th Cir. 1990).
200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 540 (1976).
201. Id. § 540 app. (1989) (citing Mallis v. Bankers Trust Co., 615 F.2d 68, 80 (2d Cir.
1980)).
202. See Dupuy v. Dupuy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1018 (5th Cir. 1977); Zobrist v. Coal-X,
Inc., 708 F.2d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1983); see also Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v.
Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985); infra text accompanying note 226.
203. Dupuy, 551 F.2d at 1020.
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dards of conduct in the securities industry.”204 As the Second Circuit
stated in an early securities fraud case: “We need not stop to decide . . . how far common-law fraud was shown. For the business of
selling investment securities has been considered one peculiarly in
need of regulation for the protection of the investor.”205 It is inconsistent with the overriding investor-protection purpose of the securities laws to deny recovery to a municipality, college, or other institutional investor, where a broker earned enormous commissions by
intentionally or recklessly recommending unsuitable securities, even
where the institution’s investment officers did not exercise due diligence, owing to overwork, gullibility, insufficient experience, or simply negligence. Furthermore, the psychological “chemistry” and interaction between the broker and the investment officer may not be
adequately described by conventional legal terms such as justifiable
reliance or due diligence. It has been pointed out that some brokers,
tempted by “subtle opportunism,” will manipulate the motivation of
their institutional customers to take inappropriate risks in order to
create demand for the investment products they are selling.206 Such
manipulation is a fraud because it violates the implied representation
that a broker makes that he will place the economic interests of his
customers ahead of his own.207
The securities laws have broad remedial purposes that go beyond
remedying individual wrongs.208 One of these purposes is enhancing
the confidence of the investing public in the honesty and stability of
the securities markets. The private right of action is a powerful tool
that is used to enforce the securities laws and to deter brokers from
making unsuitable recommendations. Moreover, there is a strong
policy reason for protecting institutional investors from fraudulent

204. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 389 (1983) (stating that the
securities laws were designed to add to protections provided to investors by common law). The
Supreme Court has, however, referred to common law principles when interpreting Rule 10b5 in other cases. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227–28 (1980).
205. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943); see also LOSS &
SELIGMAN, supra note 194, at 850 (“The fact is that the courts have repeatedly said that the
fraud provisions in the SEC Acts . . . are not limited to circumstances that would give rise to a
common law action for deceit.”).
206. See Langevoort, supra note 20, at 641.
207. See Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir.
1998).
208. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1971); J.I. Case
Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 431 (1964).
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sales practices, even where the financial officers of the institutions
may not have exercised sufficient care in making their investment decisions. The beneficiaries of these institutions are taxpayers, shareholders, pensioners, depositors, and the like, who should not bear
the burden of losses suffered as a result of unsuitable recommendations made intentionally or recklessly. Yet, ironically, the federal securities laws, which were enacted to give a plaintiff additional protections not afforded by the common law, today may give less
protection than the common law of torts to an institutional investor
to whom a broker recommended an unsuitable investment.209
The Supreme Court has considered the question of the plaintiff’s
reliance in a private suit brought under Rule 10b-5 only on two occasions. In both instances it relaxed the requirement by allowing a
presumption of reliance under some circumstances.210 It is certainly
possible that, if the question of whether a plaintiff in a suitability suit
must prove justifiable reliance or due diligence were presented to the
Court, the Court would similarly relax the requirement.

2. Borrowing from sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act
Although section 10(b) does not indicate whether a plaintiff’s reliance, justifiable reliance, or due diligence is a necessary element of a
private suit, the Supreme Court has provided guidance as to how a
court should proceed in determining the extent of a plaintiff’s implied rights under section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. In two cases decided during the 1990s, the Supreme Court filled such gaps in the
statutory scheme by borrowing provisions from analogous express
civil liability provisions of the securities laws. In so doing, the Court
hypothesized that if Congress had created a private right of action
under section 10(b), it would have used similar provisions. In
Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson,211 the
Court borrowed the one- and three-year statute of section 9(e) of

209. See Margaret V. Sachs, The Relevance of Tort Law Doctrines to Rule 10b-5:
Should Careless Plaintiffs Be Denied Recovery?, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 96 (1985).
210. In Affiliated Ute, the Court held that, in a case involving primarily a failure to disclose, reliance would be presumed if the facts withheld were material. 406 U.S. at 153–54. In
Basic Inc., the Court upheld the “fraud on the market” theory, which states that, where a
company’s stock is traded in an open and developed market, a person will be held liable for
misleading statements even though the purchaser of the company’s stock does not directly rely
on the misstatement. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241–42 (1988).
211. 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
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the 1934 Act as the proper statute of limitations for a private lawsuit
brought under Rule 10b-5.212 Similarly, in Central Bank of Denver,
N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A.,213 one of the Court’s
grounds for rejecting any implied liability for aiding and abetting a
10b-5 violation was that the express-liability provisions of the 1933
and 1934 Acts do not impose liability on aiders and abettors.
If a similar borrowing technique is used to determine what obligations should be placed on a plaintiff asserting a 10b-5 claim, including a suitability claim, it can be plausibly argued that the closest
analogies are sections 11214 and 12(a)(2),215 the express-liability provisions of the 1933 Act.216 These provisions give an investor in a
public offering of securities the right to recover his losses from a defendant who has made misstatements or omissions of material fact.
Neither of these express-liability provisions conditions a plaintiff’s recovery on reliance (whether justifiable or not) on the misstatements
or omissions; nor do sections 11 or 12(a)(2) impose any duty of due
diligence on the plaintiff.217 These provisions bar a plaintiff from re212. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides an express right of action to a person
who suffers harm as the result of a violation of section 9, which prohibits various kinds of manipulative conduct. 15 U.S.C. § 78I(e) (1994).
213. 511 U.S. 164 (1994).
214. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000). Section 11 provides that where a registration statement
filed under the Act contains an untrue statement or omission of material fact, the purchaser of
a registered security may sue certain designated persons, including the issuer of the security,
any signer of the registration statement, any director, and any underwriter of the security.
215. 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2) (2000). Section 12(a)(2) provides that a person who offers or
sells a security by means of a prospectus or oral communication that contains an untrue statement or omission of material fact is liable to the purchaser of the security.
216. The other possible express-liability analogies are sections 9(e) and 18(a) of the 1934
Act. Section 9(e) provides an express right of action to a person who purchased or sold a security at a price that was affected by a violation of the anti-manipulative provisions of section
9(a), (b), or (c). Section 9(e) does not include a plaintiff’s-reliance requirement. Section 18(a)
provides a private right of action to any purchaser or seller of a security against any person who
made a false statement or omission in a document filed with the SEC. This provision requires
that the plaintiff have relied on the false statement or omission but does not require that the
reliance be justifiable or that the plaintiff have exercised due diligence. Sections 9(e) and 18(a)
are provisions of narrow scope, which are seldom used by litigants. Neither is as closely analogous to Rule 10b-5 as sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the 1933 Act, which, like Rule 10b-5, contain broad prohibitions against misstatements and omissions of material fact.
217. Section 11(a) allows a plaintiff to recover his losses from the issuer and certain specified categories of persons “unless it is proved that at the time [he acquired the securities] he
knew of [the] untruth or omission.” 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1994) (emphasis added). Section
11(a) imposes a reliance requirement on the plaintiff only in the event that he acquired the
security at least twelve months after the effective date of the registration statement, under very
limited circumstances. Section 12(a)(2) allows a purchaser of a security to recover losses from
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covery only if he actually knew of the untruth or omission at the
time he acquired the security.
Congress’s decision not to impose a duty of justifiable reliance or
due diligence on a plaintiff in sections 11 and 12(a)(2) is consistent
with the underlying purposes of the securities laws: to protect investors and to ensure the maintenance of fair and honest markets.218
Significantly, sections 11 and 12(a)(2), unlike section 10(b) of the
1934 Act and Rule 10b-5, do not premise the defendant’s liability
on scienter (i.e., intentional or reckless conduct). These expressliability sections subject a defendant to liability based on negligence.219 Congress did not allow the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff to be raised as a defense under these express-liability provisions; there are even stronger policy reasons in favor of allowing even
a negligent 10b-5 plaintiff to recover, where liability exists only if the
defendant was guilty of intentional or reckless conduct. Using the
same method of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court might
well hold that a plaintiff bringing a suitability claim under Rule 10b5 should not be required to prove justifiable reliance on the defendant’s false statements or omissions regarding the suitability of the
recommended securities, but should be barred from recovery only if
it actually knew that the securities were unsuitable.
3. Bateman Eichler: The in pari delicto defense
Placing a duty on the plaintiff, whether articulated as a requirement of justifiable reliance or of due diligence, is an anomaly in the
federal securities laws, in that it may in fact impose a higher standard
of conduct on the plaintiff than it does on the defendant. A merely
negligent plaintiff may be barred from recovering losses from a defendant who acted intentionally or recklessly. This result seems inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding that the considerations
of equity and investor protection, on which Rule 10b-5 is based,
may allow recovery by a plaintiff who acts illegally or otherwise
the seller, the only proviso being: “the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission.”
15 U.S.C. § 77l(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
218. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1994).
219. A defendant in a section 11 case, other than the issuer, has a defense if he exercised
due diligence. The issuer, however, does not even have a “due diligence” defense under section 11(b). A defendant in a section 12(a)(2) case has a defense if he can “sustain the burden
of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of
[the] untruth or omission.” Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77l(2) (1994).
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wrongfully. In Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner,220 the
Court held that even a 10b-5 plaintiff who himself was engaged in
wrongful conduct is not barred from suit by the common law doctrine of in pari delicto unless two conditions are met: first, the plaintiff’s misconduct must be at least substantially equal to that of the
defendant and, second, “preclusion of suit would not significantly
interfere with the effective enforcement of the securities laws and
protection of the investing public.”221
Although Bateman Eichler involved the defense of in pari
delicto,222 and not the requirement that the plaintiff justifiably rely
on the defendant’s misstatements, the public policy issues involved
are similar. In fact, the argument for allowing recovery by a plaintiff
whose only fault was a failure to exercise due diligence is stronger
than for one who was guilty of wrongful conduct. In Bateman
Eichler, the Supreme Court emphasized that there is a strong policy
reason for allowing recovery and pointed out that “implied private
actions provide ‘a most effective weapon in the enforcement’ of the
securities laws and are ‘a necessary supplement to Commission action.’”223
The suitability doctrine has a public purpose that goes beyond
enabling a plaintiff to recover its losses. Broker-dealers act as conduits of information between the markets and public investors, and
the stability and efficiency of the markets depends on brokers making
honest and well-informed recommendations. Although an institution
may be at fault for allowing incompetent persons to make investment
decisions, it is inconsistent with the policy underlying the Bateman
Eichler decision to bar an institutional plaintiff from suit under Rule
10b-5 because its agents did not justifiably rely on the defendant’s
intentional or reckless misstatements or omissions, or did not exercise due diligence in managing their investments.

220. 472 U.S. 299 (1985).
221. Id. at 310–11.
222. The name of the defense is an abbreviation of the Latin phrase “in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis,” which means “‘[i]n a case of equal or mutual fault . . . the position of the [defending] party . . . is the better one.’” Id. at 306 (quoting BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 711 (5th ed. 1979)).
223. Id. at 310 (quoting J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964)).
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4. The “fraudulent conduct” theory of liability: The problem of
control of the account by the broker
The second theory that supports a suitability claim under Rule
10b-5 is that recommending unsuitable securities is an inherently deceptive practice, and thus fraud by conduct. The few courts that have
discussed the fraudulent-conduct theory have suggested that the
plaintiff be required to prove and plead that the broker who recommended the unsuitable securities “controlled” the institutional investor’s account. The control requirement would greatly increase the
difficulty that an institutional investor making this kind of claim
would face.
As stated above, The Second Circuit’s decision in Clark v. John
Lamula Investors, Inc.224 was the first time any appellate court held
that a recommendation of unsuitable securities violated Rule 10b-5.
Clark was based on the theory that such a recommendation constituted fraudulent conduct, in violation of subsection (c) of Rule 10b5, which prohibits conduct that would operate as a fraud or deceit
on any person. The fraud arises from an implied representation made
to the customer by the broker that he will act in the customer’s interest, and that making an unsuitable recommendation violates that
implied representation.225 This rationale is known as the “shingle
theory,” a theory developed by the SEC in the early days of federal
securities regulation226 and upheld by the courts up to the present
time.227 The shingle theory posits that when a broker-dealer hangs
out its shingle (i.e., holds itself out as doing business with the public), it makes an implied representation to its customers that it will
deal with them fairly and in accordance with professional standards
of conduct.228 If the broker-dealer fails to act in this manner, it has
violated the implied representation that it made, and has, therefore,

224. 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1978).
225. See Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 135 F.3d 266 (3d Cir.
1998) (holding that broker-dealer’s failure to execute an order in a manner consistent with its
duty of best execution is deceptive because the broker-dealer’s conduct contradicts an implied
representation to the customer that it will act in such a way as to maximize the customer’s
economic gain).
226. In re Duker & Duker, 6 S.E.C. 386 (1939).
227. See, e.g., Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943); Grandon v.
Merrill Lynch & Co., 147 F.3d 184, 192 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Allen D. Madison, Derivatives Regulation in the Context of the Shingle Theory, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 271.
228. See POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 3.01[A], at 3-4 to 3-5.
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committed a fraud on its customers.229 The deception requirement
that the Supreme Court established in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green230 is thus satisfied, even though the defendant did not make a
misrepresentation or omission of a material fact.231
In O’Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co.,232 the Tenth Circuit suggested that a plaintiff claiming that an unsuitable recommendation
violated Rule 10b-5 under the “fraudulent conduct” theory of liability would face an additional difficulty. It will be recalled that in Clark
the Second Circuit held that a broker who, acting with scienter,
makes an unsuitable recommendation to a customer is deemed to
have engaged in deceptive conduct in violation of Rule 10b-5.233
The O’Connor court stated that, in addition to these requirements,
the plaintiff must plead and prove that the broker exercised control
over the customer’s account.234 In dictum,235 the court reasoned that
229. It has been held to be a fraud for a broker-dealer to recommend a security if the
broker does not have a reasonable basis for the recommendation. Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589,
596 (2d Cir. 1969).
230. 430 U.S. 462, 473–74 (1977). In Santa Fe, the Court stated that section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 were not violated in the absence of “any deception, misrepresentation or nondisclosure.” Id. at 476 (emphasis added). Thus, it is possible that deceptive conduct can give rise
to a 10b-5 violation.
231. The shingle theory has thus far survived the Supreme Court’s holding in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), that in order to be liable under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, a defendant must have acted with scienter, or “intent to deceive, manipulate or
defraud.” Id. at 188. Given that all of the circuit courts that have considered the question have
interpreted scienter as encompassing reckless as well as intentional conduct, misconduct by
broker-dealers such as making unsuitable recommendations is likely to pass the test of scienter.
See POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW, supra note 1, § 3.01[D][4], at 3-34. Furthermore, scienter
can be inferred from a broker-dealer’s conduct that violates the broker-dealer’s implied representation to its customer that it will maximize the customer’s economic gain. Newton v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 273 (3d Cir. 1998). For a view
that the Supreme Court would probably reject the shingle theory today if a proper case were
presented to it, see Roberta S. Karmel, Is the Shingle Theory Dead?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1271 (1995).
232. 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992).
233. See supra notes 171–72 and accompanying text.
234. O’Connor, 965 F.2d at 898. The court analogized a suitability claim to a “churning” (i.e., excessive trading) claim, for which control by the broker is a necessary element. Id.
The court reasoned that if control were not required, a plaintiff in a churning case could evade
the control requirement by framing it as an unsuitability case. See also City of San Jose v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., No. C 84-20601 RFP, 1991 WL 352485 (N.D. Cal.
June 6, 1991). The same reasoning has been used in suitability cases brought under state securities laws. See Minneapolis Employees Ret. Fund v. Allison-Williams Co., 519 N.W.2d 176,
180 (Minn. 1994) (holding that an unsuitability claim under the Minnesota Securities Act requires the three O’Connor elements of unsuitability, scienter, and control).
235. See O’Connor, 965 F.2d at 898–99 (dismissing the 10b-5 claim on the ground that
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the additional element of control “is essential to satisfy the causation/reliance requirement of a § 10(b), Rule 10b-5 violation.”236 Although the court did not explain this statement, it was apparently
based on the assumption that if the broker does not control the account, it may be supposed that the customer exercised her own
judgment in making the investment decision. Thus, the causal chain
between the broker’s recommendation and the customer’s loss
would be broken.237 This view, however, does not take into account
the possibility that a customer who retains control of her account
may nevertheless accept her broker’s recommendations because she
places her trust and confidence in the broker’s superior knowledge
and expertise in investment matters. In that case, the causal connection between the unsuitable recommendation and the plaintiff’s loss
would not be broken.
To be sure, an institutional investor with an unsuitability claim is
likely to have difficulty establishing that the broker controlled its account. Control by a broker is most easily shown where the customer
has given the broker formal written discretionary authority to decide
on the securities to be bought and sold in the account. It is relatively
rare for an institutional investor to give a broker such discretion.
Many institutions use several brokers to obtain investment advice
and execute transactions for them, so it is unlikely that any one broker can be said to control an institutional account. Furthermore, financial officers of institutions are in some sense professionals, whose
responsibility it is to manage the institution’s investments. It seems
inconsistent with that responsibility for the officer to turn over the
authority to trade the account to a broker.
Nevertheless, even where a broker does not have formal trading
discretion, he may still have de facto control over a customer’s account. In Follansbee v. Davis, Skaggs & Co.,238 a leading case on the
question of what constitutes control in this context, the Ninth Circuit took the position that a broker does not control a customer’s
nondiscretionary account simply because the customer routinely follows the broker’s recommendations. More is required:
defendant did not act with scienter).
236. Id. at 898.
237. This view does not take account of the possibility that a customer who retains control of her account may nevertheless accept her broker’s recommendations because she relies
on the broker’s superior knowledge and expertise in investment matters.
238. 681 F.2d 673 (9th Cir. 1982).
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If a broker is formally given discretionary authority to buy and sell
for the account of his customer, he clearly controls it. Short of that,
the account may be in the broker’s control if his customer is unable
to evaluate his recommendations and to exercise an independent
judgment. . . .
The touchstone is whether or not the customer has sufficient intelligence and understanding to evaluate the broker’s recommendations and to reject one when he thinks it unsuitable.239

Assuming that “sufficient intelligence and understanding to
evaluate the broker’s recommendation” means the same thing as sophistication,240 the control requirement makes it difficult, if not impossible, even for an unsophisticated investor to recover under the
“fraudulent conduct” theory of liability for an unsuitable recommendation under Rule 10b-5.241 If an institutional investor were presumed to be sophisticated, it would therefore be difficult for the investor to satisfy the control requirement.
The foregoing discussion of liability under Rule 10b-5 for unsuitable recommendations demonstrates that under current 10b-5
jurisprudence, an institutional investor plaintiff has substantial, if not
insuperable, obstacles to overcome. If the plaintiff alleges that the
broker-dealer intentionally or recklessly made a misrepresentation or
omission of a material fact, under the lower federal courts’ interpretation of Rule 10b-5 the plaintiff must be able to demonstrate that it
justifiably relied on the misrepresentation or omission or, in some jurisdictions, that it exercised due diligence. If, on the other hand, the
plaintiff alleges that the broker-dealer, by making an unsuitable recommendation, engaged in deceptive conduct, there is some authority supporting the proposition that the plaintiff must be able to show
that the broker-dealer controlled its account. The degree of difficulty
in showing either justifiable reliance or control by the broker will depend to a large extent on whether the institution is considered to be
a sophisticated investor.

239. Id. at 676–77.
240. Id. Arguably, even an unsophisticated investor could have sufficient intelligence and
understanding to evaluate a broker’s recommendation.
241. See Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 639 F. Supp.
108, 115 (W.D. Tenn. 1986) (finding that question of whether a broker’s failure to advise an
institutional customer of the risks eliminated the customer’s control over the account was for
the jury to decide).
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On the other hand, Supreme Court has suggested (at least by
implication) that it would not interpret Rule 10b-5 so narrowly in a
suitability case. The requirement imposed by the majority of the
lower federal courts that in order to recover, the plaintiff must have
justifiably relied on the defendant’s misstatements or omissions is inconsistent with the policy underlying the Court’s holding in Bateman Eichler, and with the Court’s technique of “borrowing” from
express-liability provisions when construing elements of the 10b-5
implied right of action. Furthermore, the supposed requirement that
the plaintiff in a “deceptive conduct” suitability case prove that the
broker exercised control over the account, while not implausible, is
supported by little more than dictum and does not seem necessary in
order to establish the causative connection between the defendant’s
misconduct and the plaintiff’s loss.

C. Suitability Under the Common Law
1. Breach of fiduciary duty
There is a substantial body of law that states that a broker who
recommends an unsuitable security breaches its fiduciary duty to his
customer.242 The source of this duty is the common law of agency,
which holds that an agent, by virtue of his relationship to his principal, is considered a fiduciary with respect to all matters within the
scope of his agency.243 A fiduciary is subject to duties that “go beyond mere fairness and honesty; they oblige him to act to further the
beneficiary’s best interests.”244 The Supreme Court of Colorado, for
example, has held that if a broker makes a recommendation, or
merely brings a possible investment to the attention of the customer,

242. An unsuitable recommendation may also be a common law fraud if the broker
makes an express or implied representation to his customer that the security is suitable for him.
One of the earliest suitability decisions (involving the sale of an insurance policy, not a security)
contains a highly interesting discussion of common law fraud in this context. Anderson v.
Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961).
243. See THE LAW COMMISSION, FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND REGULATORY RULES,
CONSULTATION PAPER NO. 124, 28 (1992). Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV.
795, 800–01 (1983); Langevoort, supra note 20, at 675–80; Eileen Scallen, Promises Broken
vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L.
REV. 897, 908–10.
244. Deborah A. DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988
DUKE L.J. 879, 882.
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the broker may be in breach of its fiduciary duty to the customer if
the broker ignores the unsuitability of the investment, even if the
customer assents to the transaction.245
State law is not consistent, however, on the question of whether
the relationship between a broker and its customer is fiduciary in nature. In general, a fiduciary relationship exists where one person reposes trust and confidence in another and where the other person
encourages or accepts the trust and confidence.246 In New York, the
broker-customer relationship is considered to be a fiduciary one,
with the proviso that the broker’s fiduciary obligation is limited to
the matters entrusted to the broker by the customer.247 The California courts have also held that the customer-broker relationship is fiduciary in nature. 248 The Massachusetts courts, on the other hand,
state that a “simple stockbroker-customer relationship” is considered
not a fiduciary but rather a business relationship, unless the customer, with the broker’s consent, has given the broker discretionary
authority to trade the account.249 In other jurisdictions, the relationship between a broker and its customer is a fiduciary one only under
special circumstances, as where the broker exercises discretion in selecting securities for the customer’s account; where the broker, even
lacking discretionary authority, nevertheless has control over the account; or where the customer reposes trust and confidence in the
broker.250

2. Broker-Dealers’ common law duties
Regardless of whether or not the broker-customer relationship is
labeled as fiduciary, a broker may be under a common law duty not

245. Rupert v. Clayton Brokerage Co., 737 P.2d 1106, 1109 (Colo. 1987).
246. See 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 2, at 213 (1987).
247. For example, if a customer does not depend on his broker for investment advice but
does depend on him for execution of transactions, the broker may be considered to be a fiduciary with respect to the latter activity but not the former. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Servs.
Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Conway v. Icahn & Co., 16 F.3d 504, 510
(2d Cir. 1994) (“The relationship between a stockbroker and its customer is that of principal
and agent and is fiduciary in nature, according to New York law.”).
248. Duffy v. Cavalier, 259 Cal. Rptr. 162, 171 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
249. See Brine v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 745 F.2d 100, 103 (1st Cir.
1984); Carr v. Warner, 137 F. Supp. 611 (D. Mass. 1955).
250. For a survey of the cases discussing the circumstances under which the brokercustomer relationship is considered to be a fiduciary one, see POSER, BROKER-DEALER LAW,
supra note 1, §§ 2.01–.02, at 2-3 to 2-47.
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to recommend unsuitable securities. In Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc.,251 a case that is frequently cited for its detailed
discussion of a stockbroker’s common law duties, the district court
strongly suggested the existence of such a duty. The court stated that
a broker exercising investment discretion on behalf of its customer
“becomes the fiduciary of his customer in a broad sense” and must
“manage the account in a manner directly comporting with the
needs and objectives of the customer as stated in the authorization
papers or as apparent from the customer’s investment and trading
history.”252 Even as to a nondiscretionary account, the broker has a
duty “to recommend a stock only after studying it sufficiently to become informed as to its nature, price and financial prognosis” and
“to inform the customer of the risks involved in purchasing or selling
a particular security.”253 The broker’s explanation of these risks will
depend on the sophistication of the customer:
For example, where the customer is uneducated or generally unsophisticated with regard to financial matters, the broker will have to
define the potential risks of a particular transaction carefully and
cautiously. Conversely, where a customer fully understands the dynamics of the stock market or is personally familiar with a security,
the broker’s explanation of such risks may be merely perfunctory.254

Although the court did not expressly characterize the duties of a
broker for a nondiscretionary account as fiduciary duties, the duties
cited in Leib are among those that agency law imposes on an agent,
as applied in the particular context of the customer-broker relationship. Thus, the Restatement of Agency states that an agent is required to exercise care and skill in performing his duties and “to give
his principal information relevant to affairs entrusted to him.”255 Another district court has suggested that a broker’s unsuitable recommendation may constitute negligence, since it is a breach of the broker’s duty to its customer to use due care to ensure that its
investment advice is competent.256

251. 461 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981).
252. Leib, 461 F. Supp. at 953.
253. Id. (citing Cash v. Frederick & Co., 57 F.R.D. 71 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Hanly v. SEC,
415 F.2d 589 (2d Cir. 1989)).
254. Id. at 953.
255. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958).
256. Baker v. Wheat First Sec., 643 F. Supp. 1420, 1430–31 (S.D. W. Va. 1986).
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The California Court of Appeals has held that a broker’s unsuitable recommendation to an institutional customer may be a breach
of fiduciary duty, even if the account is nondiscretionary and even if
the customer’s representative tells the broker that he wishes to engage in transactions that would be unsuitable for the institution. In
Duffy v. Cavalier,257 the trustee of a company’s employee profitsharing plan asked a stockbroker if it would trade in options for him
on behalf of the plan. The court held that the relationship between a
broker and its customer is fiduciary in nature, and that the broker
had breached its fiduciary duty to the plan by recommending unsuitable securities, even though the institution’s agent had expressed a
wish to trade in these securities.258 In this regard, the court adopted a
broad view of the extent of a broker’s duties:
[W]here an apparently unsophisticated investor expresses a desire to engage in speculative investments with the objective of making large profits, the stockbroker cannot simply carry out the customer’s wishes. Rather, the stockbroker has a fiduciary duty (1) to
ascertain that the investor understands the investment risks in the
light of his or her actual financial situation; (2) to inform the customer that no speculative investments are suitable if the customer
persists in wanting to engage in such speculative transactions without the stockbroker’s being persuaded that the customer is able to
bear the financial risks involved; and (3) to refrain completely from
soliciting the customer’s purchase of any speculative securities
which the stockbroker considers to be beyond the customer’s risk
threshold. As long as these duties are met, if the customer nevertheless insists on purchasing speculative securities, the stockbroker
is not barred from advising the customer about various speculative
securities and purchasing for the customer those securities which
the customer selects.259
...
A stockbroker’s fiduciary duty requires more than merely carrying out the stated objectives of the customer; at least where there is
evidence . . . that the stockbroker’s recommendations were invariably followed, the stockbroker must “determine the customer’s ac257. 259 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (citing Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones &
Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968)).
258. Id.; see also Conway v. Icahn & Co., 16 F.3d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1994).
259. 259 Cal. Rptr. at 169 (citing Twomey, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 222).
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tual financial situation and needs.” If it would be improper and unsuitable to carry out the speculative objectives expressed by the customer, there is a further obligation on the part of the stockbroker
“to make this known to [the customer], and [to] refrain from acting except upon [the customer’s] express orders.” Under such circumstances, although the stockbroker can advise the customer
about the speculative options available, he or she should not solicit
the customer’s purchase of any such speculative securities that
would be beyond the customer’s “risk threshold.”260

Other courts and arbitrators have agreed that a broker’s unsuitable recommendation to an institutional investor constitutes a breach
of fiduciary duty. In MidAmerica Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,261 the defendant brokerage firm
recommended the purchase of GNMA securities to the plaintiff, a
savings and loan institution, but failed to explain to its representatives some of the crucial terms of these securities. The Tenth Circuit
affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, on the ground that
the recommendation breached the defendant’s fiduciary duty. The
court found that the defendant was in a position of strength because
it had held out its agent (the broker) as an expert. The plaintiff,
which happened to be temporarily without the services of an inhouse financial advisor, relied on the agent’s advice and was thereby
lulled into a false sense of security.262
Furthermore, basic principles of agency law suggest that a broker
is under a duty not to recommend an investment to an entity that is
not legally permitted to make the investment. Professional standards
of conduct also require the broker to make some inquiry as to
whether the investment may legally be made. Institutional managers
themselves have fiduciary obligations to the owners or beneficiaries
of the institution (or to the taxpayers, in the case of government entities), and a broker who recommends an investment to an institution may not aid and abet a manager’s breach of fiduciary duty. As
one commentator has observed, although courts will not shift liability to a broker for executing trades in unsuitable investments made at

260. Duffy, 259 Cal. Rptr. at 173.
261. 886 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1989).
262. Id. at 1258; see also In re Westchester Jewish Ctr., 1994-004243, 1994 NYSE Arb.
Dec. LEXIS 615 (June 28, 1995) (holding brokerage firm liable to synagogue for failing to
disclose the nature of the CMOs it recommended, and for recommending unsuitable investments, in light of claimant’s investment objectives).
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the direction of a trustee for the account of a trust,
it is reasonable and prudent, however, to require the broker (a) to
ensure that the fiduciary is capable of understanding and assessing
in an investment context the information and recommendations
that the broker provides and (b) to present to the fiduciary only
those investments that are legally permissible under state law and
the trust instrument.263

Imposing such a fiduciary requirement on a broker is consistent
with the NYSE’s “know your customer” rule, which establishes a
professional standard for the securities industry, even though the rule
itself does not specify the documents or information that the broker
must obtain in performing his due diligence.264 It is reasonable to interpret the “know your customer” rule to require a broker-dealer
who recommends a security to an institutional investor to ascertain
any legal restrictions and risk parameters that limit the institution’s
permissible investments. If the broker has any reason to believe that a
recommendation would involve the institution in illegal or ultra vires
conduct, the broker has an obligation to make an inquiry into the
matter before making the recommendation.
It may be insufficient for a broker-dealer to rely on what he is
told by a institutional customer’s financial officer or other representative. If the broker-dealer has a fiduciary duty, the duty is to the institution itself, not to the financial officer. This duty would presumably require the broker-dealer to examine applicable requirements or
prohibitions of law regarding investments, the institutional customer’s enabling instrument, and any written investment policy that
the institution’s governing board has adopted. Although the “know
your customer” rule is not itself a legal requirement, it establishes an
industry standard of conduct, which is highly relevant in a suit based
on breach of fiduciary or negligence.265 The policy reasons in favor of
imposing such a requirement on a broker-dealer go beyond recompensing the customer for the losses it has suffered, although that is a
worthwhile goal; it will promote stable and honest markets by deterring brokers from making unsuitable recommendations to institutional customers.
263. James S. Shorris, Suitability Obligations of Broker-Dealers for Trust Accounts: Who
Is the Customer?, 7 SEC. NEWS, No. 1 (1997) at 33.
264. N.Y. Stock Exchange, NYSE Rule 405, NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 3696 (2000).
265. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 333 (5th Cir. 1981).
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3. Judicial interpretation of the common law duty
Despite this background, in recent years several decisions have
demonstrated indifference, if not downright hostility, to institutional
investors bringing common law suitability claims. Three recent decisions have rejected such claims on the ground that the relationship
between broker and customer is not of a fiduciary character. In a
widely noted case, State v. Morgan Stanley & Co.,266 the State of
West Virginia sued in state court to recover heavy market losses sustained by its Consolidated Fund (the “Fund”), a state investment
pool established in order to put idle monies of the State, its agencies,
and local governments to work.267 The State charged Morgan
Stanley with aiding and abetting state officials in a breach of fiduciary
duty, by speculating in the market for U.S. government securities,
and with constructive fraud.
Although the Fund had earlier engaged in a limited amount of
trading in short-term securities, in 1985 it began buying and selling
securities with maturities of up to thirty years. Such long-term securities are sensitive to fluctuations in interest rates and carry with them
substantial market risk.268 Furthermore, the State bought options,
which greatly magnified the risks. In fact, some of the Fund’s trading
activities were essentially bets on the future direction of interest
rates, and these bets were made with the help and encouragement of
Morgan Stanley. The transactions included the sale to Morgan
Stanley of a “put” on seven-year Treasury notes and the purchase of
$1.2 billion in “when issued” seven-year Treasury notes. Morgan
Stanley also lent money to the State to allow it to pursue its aggressive trading strategy. Morgan Stanley provided “investment information to the State and it aggressively pursued the State as a customer.”269 “In the spring of 1987, the . . . bond market took an
unexpected . . . nosedive and [the Fund] . . . sustained enormous
losses,”270 whereupon the State sued Morgan Stanley.
On the eve of jury deliberations, the trial court granted summary
judgment to the State on its claim that Morgan Stanley had know-

266. 459 S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995).
267. Id. at 908.
268. Id. at 909 & n.5.
269. Morgan Stanley, 459 S.E.2d at 910. For a detailed description of these transactions,
see Leslie Wayne, Big Risks, Big Losses, Big Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 23, 1995, § 3, at 1.
270. 459 S.E.2d at 909.
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ingly aided and abetted State officials in violating the West Virginia
Code, which provides that persons managing State funds must exercise
that degree of judgment and care, under circumstances then prevailing, which men of experience, prudence, discretion and intelligence exercise in the management of their own affairs, not for
speculation but for investment, considering the probable safety of
their capital as well as the probable income to be derived.271

The trial court awarded the State $52 million in damages. The
State’s separate claim that Morgan Stanley had committed constructive fraud was submitted to the jury, which found in favor the State
and awarded it $4.9 million.272 The West Virginia Supreme Court
reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the aiding
and abetting claim, and it also set aside the jury verdict on the constructive fraud claim on the ground that the trial judge had given erroneous instructions to the jury.273 Although the court’s opinion did
not expressly refer to the suitability doctrine, it appeared to reject the
doctrine by implication. The court stated:
Morgan Stanley was not at any time a fiduciary of the State of West
Virginia; Morgan Stanley was a co-principal, which bought and
sold notes and bonds from and to the State . . . , bought and sold
put and call options from and to the State . . . , and lent money to
the State . . . (secured by bonds owned by the State) to allow the
State to pursue its aggressive trading strategy.274
...

271. Id. at 911 (citing W. VA. CODE § 12-6-12 (1978)).
272. The tort of constructive fraud is closely related to a breach of fiduciary duty. The
California Court of Appeals has defined it as follows:
Constructive fraud arises on a breach of duty by one in a confidential or fiduciary relationship to another which induces justifiable reliance by the latter to his prejudice. . . . Such a confidential relationship may exist whenever a person with justification places trust and confidence in the integrity and fidelity of another.
Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 237 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968).
273. Without specifying the portion of the instruction on constructive fraud that was erroneous, the Supreme Court stated that the “instruction, combined with the trial court’s instruction informing the jury that Morgan Stanley had violated West Virginia law by aiding and
abetting ‘speculation,’ was tantamount to directing a verdict against Morgan Stanley on the
constructive fraud claim.” Morgan Stanley, 459 S.E.2d at 913.
274. Id. at 910.
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Notwithstanding that Morgan Stanley sedulously cultivated
good customer relations with the State of West Virginia, Morgan
Stanley was nonetheless a principal in the transactions at stake, not
a broker, and Morgan had the right to trade with the State without
undertaking the obligation to insure the State against its elected officers’ lack of wisdom. “Sophistication”, as that term is used in the
investment law, should never be confused with intelligence, prudence or good luck.275

The court went further, opining that the state officials were sophisticated investors and, therefore, not deserving of protection from
the court:
It is hard to find fraud—constructive or otherwise—when officials
at the State Treasury were: (a) sophisticated investors; and (b) audited by other State officials, including the State Legislative Auditor. The Board of Investments approved the actions that are at issue . . . ; to say that Morgan Stanley could not reasonably have
relied on [the State officials’] undisputed and very earnest representations that deviation [from the guidelines of the State Board of Investments] was permitted by the Board is tantamount to confessing
that West Virginia officials must at all times be treated as either
children or incompetents. We are unwilling to accede to this
proposition . . . [C]ompetent adults who do not need to be led
around on a leash do, occasionally, buy a piece or two of blue
sky.276

The Morgan Stanley court here touched on the most compelling
policy argument against applying the suitability doctrine to institutional investors: the paternalistic nature of the doctrine.277 Financial
officials of a State or other government entity are indeed not children or incompetents, and they have presumably been appointed because the governing board or managers of the institution believe
they have some ability and expertise in investments. It has been argued that applying the suitability doctrine in this kind of situation
would encourage public officials to take greater risks and would deter brokers from entering into transactions with public entities.278
This argument, however, avoids the most important question con275. Id. at 913 (footnote omitted).
276. Id. at 913 n.17.
277. See Markham, supra note 20, at 369 (arguing that the suitability rule is “a very paternalistic approach to customer protection”).
278. Roberts, supra note 20, at 834.
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cerning the transaction and the relationship between customer and
broker: Did the state’s officials rely on Morgan Stanley for advice,
and did the Morgan Stanley brokers accept the role of advisors?279 It
also begs the question as to whether the taxpayers of a state should
bear the losses, where aggressive, skillful, highly paid (and, therefore,
highly motivated) securities salesmen are able to persuade the state’s
financial agents to buy unsuitable securities? As Professor Langevoort
has observed: “[I]n many circumstances it is both natural and foreseeable for professional investment agents to rely wrongly on the
representations and recommendations of securities salespeople.
There is no reason to believe that the principal is somehow at fault
simply because its agent was tricked.”280
This is not to say that an incompetent or careless financial officer
should be exonerated. In many or most cases where an institution
suffers heavy losses owing to an unsuitable recommendation, the responsible officials of the institution are punished by losing their jobs
or even by suffering civil or criminal liability. The question, rather, is
whether a State’s taxpayers or the brokerage firm should bear the
losses, where a broker-dealer recommends securities that it knows (or
should know) to be unsuitable for a public entity.

4. A broker-dealer acting as principal can be a fiduciary
Where liability for an unsuitable recommendation rests on a theory of breach of fiduciary duty, the defense is sometimes raised that a
broker who sells the securities to the customer as a principal and not
as an agent is not a fiduciary and, therefore, cannot breach a fiduciary
duty to the customer. In suitability cases involving institutional customers, the relationship between broker and customer is said to be
an ordinary business relationship. Some courts have accepted this
reasoning, while others have stated that the capacity in which the
broker acts is just one factor and is not determinative of the nature of
the relationship.
Morgan Stanley rests on the premise that there cannot be a fiduciary relationship between a broker and an institutional customer

279. Professor Gibson states flatly that “the relationship between derivatives dealers and
end-users is not an advisory relationship.” Gibson, supra note 20, at 571. The cases that I have
discussed in this article should indicate that Professor Gibson’s unqualified assertion is unjustified.
280. Langevoort, supra note 20, at 696.
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where the broker acts as a principal, selling a security to its client,
rather than as an agent, buying the securities for its client. Under this
view, the broker was, therefore, dealing at arm’s length with its customer and was under no obligation to inform the customer that the
securities were unsuitable for it. Other recent decisions have agreed
with the dubious proposition that parties who trade with each other
as principal cannot have a fiduciary relationship. In Banca Cremi,
S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc.,281 the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal of a foreign bank’s claim that a brokerage firm’s recommendation of CMOs violated the broker’s fiduciary duty. In finding
that the relationship was not fiduciary, and that the plaintiff, therefore, could not have a suitability claim based on the breach of a fiduciary duty, the court reasoned as follows:
Epley [the brokerage firm’s salesman] and Alex. Brown were not
the agents of the Bank, but rather interacted with the Bank at arm’s
length in principal-to-principal dealings, and no common law fiduciary duty was ever created.
...
[T]he defendants did not act as agents for the Bank, but rather
conducted their business at arm’s length in a principal-to-principal
relationship. There was accordingly no formal relationship giving
rise to a fiduciary duty, and the record reveals no informal relationship which could allow the imposition of such a duty.282

The assertion that no fiduciary duty can arise where a broker sells
securities to a customer as principal, rather than as agent, was also
made in Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co.283 A very large
publicly held company sued a comparably large broker-dealer for declaratory relief and damages with respect to losses suffered from two
interest rate swaps that the company had executed with the brokerdealer.284 Although Procter & Gamble (“P&G”) did not allege un281. 132 F.3d 1017 (4th Cir. 1997).
282. Id. at 1030, 1038.
283. 925 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio 1996).
284. “A swap is an agreement between two parties . . . to exchange cash flows over a period of time. Generally, the purpose of an interest rate swap is to protect a party from interest
rate fluctuations.” For example, one party will agree to pay a fixed rate of interest, while the
other party “assumes a floating interest rate based on the amount of the principal of the underlying debt. . . . [T]his amount does not change hands; only the interest payments are exchanged.” Id. at 1275.

1564

2POS.DOC

1493]

3/5/02 9:06 PM

Liability for Unsuitable Recommendations

suitability as a separate claim, it appeared to be at least one of the
bases for the suit.285 The district court held that the swaps were not
securities and, therefore, were not covered by the federal securities
laws and, further, that they were exempt from regulation under the
Commodity Exchange Act.286 As to P&G’s claim of breach of fiduciary duty, the court applied New York law:
New York law is clear that a fiduciary relationship exists from the
assumption of control and responsibility and is founded upon trust
reposed by one party in the integrity and fidelity of another. No fiduciary relationship exists . . . [where] the two parties were acting
and contracting at arm’s length. Moreover, courts have rejected the
proposition that a fiduciary relationship can arise between parties to
a business relationship.287

The court concluded that the relationship between the parties
was not of a fiduciary nature: “P&G and BT were in a business relationship. They were counterparties. Even though . . . BT had superior knowledge in the swaps transactions, that does not convert their
business relationship into one in which fiduciary duties are imposed.”288
In these three decisions—Morgan Stanley, Banca Cremi, and
Proctor & Gamble—the courts regarded the relationship between
the broker and its institutional customer as a “business relationship”
rather than a fiduciary relationship, because the broker-dealer dealt

285. The complaint alleged fraud, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent
misrepresentation, negligence, and violations of the federal securities and commodity statutes,
the Ohio blue sky laws, and the Ohio Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Id. at 1274.
286. Id. at 1283–85.
287. Id. at 1289 (quoting Beneficial Commerce Corp. v. Murray Glick Datsun, Inc., 601
F. Supp. 770, 772 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
288. Id. at 1289. The court nevertheless held that, even in the absence of a fiduciary
duty, under New York law a party may be under an implied contractual duty to make disclosures to the other party. “Such a duty may arise where (1) a party has superior knowledge of
certain information; (2) that information is not readily available to the other party; and (3) the
first party knows that the second party is acting on the basis of mistaken knowledge.” Id. at
1290. Thus, Bankers Trust had a duty to disclose material information to P & G both before
the parties entered into the swap transactions and in their performance, and also a duty to deal
fairly and in good faith during the performance of the swap transactions. Since the claim was
one of fraud (i.e., failure to disclose material information), the plaintiff had to prove its case by
clear and convincing evidence, not mere preponderance of the evidence. Furthermore, the
plaintiff had no claim for negligent misrepresentation in the absence of a “special relationship”
between the parties. Since the parties were both sophisticated corporations whose dealings
were on a business level, there was no special relationship between them. Id. at 1289–91.
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with its institutional customer as a principal, not as an agent.289
These courts do not explain what they mean by the term “business
relationship” or why one party to a business relationship cannot also
owe fiduciary duties to the other party.
Courts have repeatedly held, however, that a broker-dealer can
have a fiduciary relationship with an institutional customer, if the
customer reposes trust and confidence in the broker-dealer, and if
the transaction that is the subject of the dispute is relevant to the
matters entrusted to the broker.290 It is true that the existence of a
fiduciary relationship (as opposed to an ordinary business relationship) is derived from agency law, and that a broker-dealer who sells a
security to a customer as principal is not acting as in the capacity of
an agent. 291 Nevertheless, the federal courts have long held that the
capacity in which a broker-dealer acts is not determinative of whether
or not a fiduciary relationship exists. In the recent case of Lehman
Brothers Commercial Corp. v. Minmetals International Non-Ferrous
Metals Trading Co.,292 the district court rejected the broker-dealer’s
argument that a broker-dealer who acted as principal in transactions
with its institutional customer could not, as a matter of law, have a
fiduciary relationship with the customer. The court stated:
At base, the existence of a fiduciary relationship is a factual question. It “cannot be determined ‘by recourse to rigid formulas;’
rather, ‘New York courts typically focus on whether one person has

289. See, e.g., Banca Cremi, S.A. v. Alex. Brown & Sons, Inc., 132 F.3d 1017, 1030
(4th Cir. 1997); Procter & Gamble, 925 F. Supp. at 1289–90; State v. Morgan Stanley, 459
S.E.2d 906 (W. Va. 1995).
290. See Press v. Chem. Inv. Serv. Corp., 166 F.3d 529, 536 (2d Cir. 1999); Union
Bank of Switzerland v. HS Equities, Inc., 457 F. Supp. 515 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (Weinfeld, J.)
(finding that broker owed a fiduciary duty to large Swiss bank to keep the bank fully informed
as to material matters that could affect the bank’s judgment with respect to transactions which
were the subject of its account); Memphis Hous. Auth. v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis,
Inc., 639 F. Supp. 108 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
291. Professor Gibson states:
As a principal to the transaction, the derivatives dealer assumes the risks associated
with the trade, just as the end-user assumes the attendant risks. Further, in derivatives transactions, the dealer and end-user are both referred to as counter-parties, a
title which suggests that both parties are at counter-positions, transacting business at
arm’s length.
Gibson, supra note 20, at 572. However, neither the fact that the dealer may assume certain
risks nor the title by which the parties are known negates the possibility that there is a fiduciary
relationship between the parties.
292. No. 94 Civ. 8301 JFK, 2000 WL 1702039 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000).
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reposed trust or confidence in another who thereby gains a resulting superiority or influence over the first.”
Courts in this District have found that a fiduciary relationship
could potentially arise in a “principal-to-principal” arm’s-length relationship based upon the degree of trust that exists in that relationship.293

Although broker-dealers usually act in the capacity of agent when
they execute transactions for customers in listed securities on stock
exchanges, they frequently act as principals in transactions in the
over-the-counter market.294 The over-the-counter market is considered a dealer market, in which broker-dealer firms frequently sell securities to customers out of their own inventory.295 Even when a
broker-dealer does not have an inventory in a security that it is selling to a customer, it nevertheless may choose to act as a principal,
rather than as agent, by buying the security from another brokerdealer acting as a market maker in the security and then reselling it
to the customer as principal.296 An “integrated” firm, which acts
both as a wholesale market maker and as a retail broker in a particular security, will normally deal as principal with both its individual
and institutional customers. Furthermore, a broker-dealer that sells

293. Id. at *26–*27 (quoting Scott v. Dime Sav. Bank, 886 F. Supp. 1073, 1078
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 101 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 1996)).
294. As two experts explained:
Over-the-counter trades are most commonly transacted on a net price basis. (That,
again, is because your “broker” acts as a dealer or principal, not an agent.) You do
not pay a commission; instead the securities dealer builds a profit margin or markup
into the price you’re asked to pay. Similarly, when you sell, the dealer buys from you
at a price that subtracts a markdown from the market’s current wholesale or inside
price.
LOUIS ENGEL & HENRY HECHT, HOW TO BUY STOCKS 130 (8th ed. 1994).
A study done by the SEC in the 1960s showed that 62.5 percent of all over-the-counter
purchases by institutional customers and 35.8 percent of all purchases by individual customers
were principal transactions. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 140, pt. II, at 612. The over-thecounter market is any market in which securities transactions are conducted through a telephone and computer network, rather than on the floor of a stock exchange. DOWNES &
GOODMAN, supra note 32, at 427.
295. Norman S. Poser, Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC’s
National Market System, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 883, 894 (1981).
296. Id. This type of transaction is called a “riskless transaction,” because the broker does
not take on the risks of ownership of the security, even though he deals as a principal, not as an
agent, with the customer. SEC SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 140, pt. II, at 611; see also JOHN
DALTON, HOW THE STOCK MARKET WORKS 87, 175 (1988).
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to a customer an OTC derivative instrument that it has itself created
is most likely to do so in a principal transaction, since it automatically
owns the security that it has created. In over-the-counter transactions, the broker-dealer may choose to execute transactions with its
customer in a principal capacity, regardless of whether the customer
has reposed trust or confidence in the broker-dealer and whether the
broker-dealer has accepted or encouraged such trust or confidence.
Given the fact that a broker-dealer is usually able to decide unilaterally whether it will deal with its customers as agent or as principal, it would be anomalous if the broker were allowed to avoid fiduciary obligations simply by choosing to act as principal. This has been
the view of the courts. For example, in a recent case, the Third Circuit held that a broker-dealer has a duty to execute customers’ transactions at the best available price, whether it is acting as principal or
agent.297 And one district court has stated:
[T]he choice of function . . . cannot be (and was never intended to
be) a means by which a broker may elect whether or not the law
will impose fiduciary standards upon him in the actual circumstances of any given relationship or transaction. . . . What is decisive
in the end is that the facts of the case disclose an “agency” relationship in the most basic and unmistakable sense of both the common
law and securities law.298

The duties that a broker owes its customer should not depend on
the broker-dealer’s choice of capacity, but rather on the usual factors
that determine whether a fiduciary relationship exists, particularly the
trust and confidence placed in the broker by the customer, the dependence of the customer on the broker’s skill and knowledge, the
equality or inequality of access to information, and the complexity of
the security being sold.299

297. Newton v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 135 F.3d 266, 270 n.1 (3d
Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Kravitz, 525 U.S. 811 (1998).
298. Opper v. Hancock Sec. Corp., 250 F. Supp. 668, 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); see also
Hughes v. SEC, 174 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (holding that broker-dealer that is also an
investment advisor with respect to transactions in which it acts as principal cannot deny its fiduciary status).
299. See Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1226–
1228 (1995); DeMott, supra note 244, at 882.
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IV. CONCLUSION

An institutional investor that institutes a lawsuit or an arbitration
against a brokerage firm to recover losses suffered as a result of an
unsuitable recommendation must overcome great difficulties under
existing legal decisions. These difficulties stem from the largely unexamined premise that every institution is a sophisticated investor and
able to fend for itself, even against a skillful securities salesperson
who misrepresents or fails to disclose the risk of a security. As a result, there are few cases where an institutional investor has been successful in asserting a suitability claim. An action based on common
law breach of fiduciary duty is likely to fail on the ground that no fiduciary relationship exists between the broker and the institution. A
suitability claim based on securities fraud is likely to fail on one of
two grounds: either that the institution did not justifiably rely on the
broker’s misrepresentations or omissions (or, in some circuits, did
not exercise due diligence), or that the broker, even if it engaged in
deceptive conduct, is not liable because it did not control the institution’s account.
The assumption that the financial officers of institutional investors are always sophisticated is a mistaken one. The officers of many
institutions lack sophistication, at least when it comes to complex derivative securities. Skillful and unscrupulous salespeople can manipulate even sophisticated financial officers. Furthermore, even where an
institution’s financial officer makes investments despite awareness
that the securities recommended to him by a broker-dealer are unsuitable for the institution, the broker-dealer has an obligation to its
institutional customer under professional securities industry standards not to recommend unsuitable securities. A broker-dealer is also
obliged to take affirmative steps to learn the legal limitations on the
institution’s permissible investments and its investment objectives, as
reflected in its formal investment policies.
Under traditional principles of securities law, a broker who intentionally or recklessly makes an unsuitable recommendation to an institutional investor should be liable to the institution for any losses
that the institution incurs if the institution can show that the recommendation was a contributory cause of its losses. A broker who
recommends a security without taking reasonable steps to learn the
investment objectives and risk tolerance (as established by its governing board within the framework of applicable law) of his institutional
customer can be deemed to be acting recklessly. Such due diligence
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would include a discussion of the institution’s investment objectives
and risk tolerance with the institution’s investment officer. It would
normally also include a review of any written investment policy of the
institution, the institution’s governing instrument, and any applicable legal restrictions on investments. Imposing these duties would
not shift to the broker the responsibility for institutional investments
that go wrong or make the broker a guarantor of the success of the
institution’s investments.300 It would simply make a broker-dealer, as
a trained professional in the securities industry, responsible for making affirmative recommendations that it knows or ought to know are
unsuitable for its institutional customers.
Placing the responsibility on the broker for the suitability of its
recommendations would promote efficiency, fairness, and the honesty of the markets. The rule would be efficient because the brokerdealer is usually in a better position than the customer to learn the
essential facts and degree of risk concerning a security that it is recommending, and can do so at a lower cost. In the case of over-thecounter derivative instruments, the broker-dealer may well have created the security that it is selling to the institution and, thus, is sure
to be more familiar with it than is the customer. An institutional investor is unlikely to have access to all of the information relating to a
security that a broker-dealer possesses. Although the institution is
likely to be more familiar with its own risk preference than the broker would be, under well established securities industry standards,
every brokerage firm has an obligation to take reasonable steps to
know its customer. Nevertheless, it is extremely unlikely that a broker would be held liable for recommending a security which, after
making a reasonable inquiry, it reasonably believed was suitable for
its institutional customer.
A rule that imposes liability on the broker-dealer for unsuitable

300. This author is aware of, but disagrees with, the statement in a recent report of the
New York City Bar Association that in the absence of a rule presuming institutional investors
to be sophisticated, dealers would become guarantors of their institutional customers’ investments. Bar of N.Y., supra note 83, at 96. Perhaps, as the report states, “it is easy (and tempting) to view any losing investment as, in hindsight, unsuitable.” Id. Unsuitability, like any
other legal concept, will sometimes be difficult to define and apply; however, as I argue in this
article, that is not sufficient reason to create a presumption that institutional investors are sophisticated, and then to bar their claims on that basis. Further, most of the decisions rejecting
liability do not do so on the ground that the recommendation was suitable for the institutional
investor, but rather that the institution should bear the responsibility for its investment decisions.
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recommendations to an institution would be a fair rule under most
circumstances. A broker-dealer who intentionally or recklessly recommends unsuitable securities to a customer is more at fault than an
institution’s financial officer who fails to exercise sufficient diligence
in managing the institution’s investments, or than an institution that
failed to hire a sufficiently sophisticated investment officer.301
A rule imposing liability on broker-dealers who recommend unsuitable securities to institutional investors also is consistent with
public policy, principally because it would deter brokers from intentionally or recklessly recommending unsuitable securities. Although
encouraging investors to exercise diligence also is an important public policy, in the area of institutional investment it is hardly necessary
to limit brokers’ liability in order to achieve that goal: institutional
investors’ financial officers are sufficiently deterred from negligent
conduct and over-reliance on brokers’ representations by the likely
prospect of being demoted or losing their jobs, or even being criminally prosecuted, regardless of whether the institution is eventually
able to recover its losses in a lawsuit or arbitration. Until the commission system of compensation that is used in the securities industry, a system which is the engine that drives high-pressure and dishonest selling, is reformed, the most effective way to deter brokerdealers and their employees from making unsuitable recommendations to institutional investors is the credible threat of a private lawsuit or arbitration.

301. See supra text accompanying notes 222–23 (discussing Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299 (1985)).
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